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TESTING FANNIE MAE’S AND FREDDIE MAC’S 
POST-CRISIS SELF-PRESERVATION POLICIES 
UNDER THE FAIR HOUSING ACT
SHELBY D. GREEN*
ABSTRACT
Beginning in the 1930s, the federal government adopted programs and policies 
toward safe and decent housing for all. The initiatives included the creation of the 
Federal Housing Administration that, among other things, spurred mortgage lending 
by guaranteeing mortgage loans to low- and moderate-income borrowers. The creation 
of the secondary mortgage market by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (“GSEs”) helped 
provide more liquidity for loan originators. However, somewhere along the way, these 
GSEs lost their way, as they pursued profitability without regard to risk and heedlessly 
bought mortgages without considering quality.
The overabundance of poor quality mortgages led to the housing market crisis in 
2008, and the GSEs faced ruin when the millions of mortgagors who took out loans 
defaulted. When the federal government intervened to rescue the GSEs, a new mission 
and attitude emerged—not one of furthering housing, but of self-preservation. This 
new attitude was revealed in heavy-handed policies calculated to recoup losses, but 
not to keep borrowers in their homes. Legislation enacted in the wake of the crisis 
invested a federal conservator with draconian powers, seemingly unchecked by state 
law constraints on lenders’ remedies or notions of fairness. The mission became 
reducing portfolios by auction sales of the properties to investors, while the foreclosed 
owners had to pay the amounts owed on the mortgages to keep their homes. The 
impacts of these policies were felt disproportionately by minority borrowers who 
originally had been offered more onerous mortgage terms on the basis of inflated 
appraisals. Early attempts by state and local authorities to temper the GSEs’ hard 
march toward solvency were met with successful assertions of federal preemption. 
This Article explores these rulings and asserts that, rather than base challenges on 
subordinate state or local laws, a better and more viable course of action is through 
the assertion of co-equal federal laws.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Déjà vu all over again!1 The parallels between the Great Depression of the 1930s 
and the Great Recession of the 2000s are striking. In the events leading up to both 
                                                          
1 A phrase commonly attributed to the late great professional baseball catcher, Yogi Berra. 
Scott Stump, ‘It’s Deja Vu All Over Again’: 27 of Yogi Berra’s Most Memorable ‘Yogi-isms’,
TODAY (Sept. 23, 2015), https://www.today.com/news/its-deja-vu-all-over-again-27-yogi-
berras-most-t45781.
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol66/iss3/5
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economic crises, Wall Street collapsed,2 banks failed,3 and the economy plunged into 
an abyss. As businesses closed,4 industrial production fell,5 unemployment rose to 
double-digits,6 and the economy shrunk in real terms. At the height of the Great 
Depression, the agricultural economy collapsed as farm prices plummeted by more 
than half.7 Home foreclosures occurred at an alarming rate; nearly one-half of urban 
houses with an outstanding mortgage were in default,8 equating to ten defaults per 
every one thousand mortgages.9 Approximately one thousand home loans were 
foreclosed every day.10 Homes with a second or third mortgage fared even worse, with 
more than 50% in default.11 One historian, Alan Brinkley, was sanguine about the 
crisis. He observed:
[The crisis] began unexpectedly, with a sudden and sickening stock market 
crash . . . . And as the economy began to slide slowly . . . , the inherent 
structural weaknesses of the New Era economy began to reveal themselves. 
There was the excessive dependence upon a few large industries, notably 
auto manufacturing and construction. Both had already begun to decline 
before [the fateful event]. There was the weakness of the banking and credit 
system, which began to collapse quickly at the first signs of economic 
trouble. There was the rickety system of international debt. Above all, there 
was the inadequate distribution of purchasing power within the United 
States itself. The American economy had become the most productive in 
the world, but the American people could not afford to buy its products. 
The result of all this was a long deflationary spiral that dragged the nation 
into crisis.12
                                                          
2 See Robert J. Samuelson, Revisiting the Great Depression, WILSON Q., Winter 2012, at 
36, 38, 41 [hereinafter Samuelson, Revisiting the Great Depression], 
http://archive.wilsonquarterly.com/essays/revisiting-great-depression; Timeline: Key Events in 
Financial Crisis, USA TODAY (Sept. 8, 2013), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/09/08/chronology-2008-financial-
crisis-lehman/2779515/.
3 See Timeline: Key Events in Financial Crisis, supra note 2; see also Samuelson, 
Revisiting the Great Depression, supra note 2, at 40.
4 Steve Lohr, Something to Fear, After All, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2009, B1.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Alan Brinkley, Prelude, WILSON Q., Spring 1982, at 51, 52.
8 David C. Wheelock, The Federal Response to Home Mortgage Distress: Lessons from 
the Great Depression, 90 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 133, 139 (2008) [hereinafter 
Wheelock, The Federal Response].
9 Id. at 138.
10 Id. (citing FED. HOME LOAN BD., FIFTH ANN. REP. 4 (1937)).
11 Id. at 139.
12 Brinkley, supra note 7, at 58–59 (footnote omitted).
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Brinkley’s narrative about the Great Depression echoes the same hallmarks of the 
more recent Great Recession.13 During the Great Recession, the Gross Domestic 
Product (“GDP”) fell a total of 5% from its peak to its trough, manufacturing output 
declined nearly 20%, new home construction plummeted 80%, more than “[e]ight and 
a half million people lost their jobs[,] and unemployment rose to 10%.”14 Stock 
markets faced similar declines.15
In both economic crises, the housing market felt the devastation most acutely.16
The shrinking economy led to mounting loan delinquencies and soaring foreclosures.17
The rapidly rising unemployment rate led to lower household incomes—reducing the 
demand for housing, among other goods and services—and precipitous drops in 
property values.18 Yet the differences in the structure of the housing market during
these two monumental events were more than superficial. In the era of the Great 
Depression, home loans generally matured in five years or less; typically, the 
individual made no or only a partial payment of the principal during the term prior to 
a balloon payment at maturity.19 Before the Great Recession, although most loans had 
                                                          
13 On the Great Depression, Steve Lohr writes: 
The . . . day [after his inauguration on March 4, 1933], [President Roosevelt] declared 
a national bank holiday, and set the Federal Reserve and the [Department of] Treasury 
to work on a phased program to sort [out] good banks from bad ones, provide 
financing[,] and restore confidence in the banking system.”
Lohr, supra note 4. 
Lohr notes that measures were carried out by the “Reconstruction Finance Corporation, . . . 
established in 1932. The agency made loans to troubled banks, and seized and sold off distressed 
assets at others. After government inspections, many . . . banks never reopened, with more than 
4,000 closed in 1933.” Id.
Historians have speculated that had the government intervened sooner, recovery would 
have been quicker. As it stood, the economy did not fully revive until a decade after the 
crash, in great measure as a consequence of the military escalation for World War II. 
Most historians still recognize the need for massive governmental spending—“[b]y 
1942, [the] total government spending as a share of the economy rose to 52[%], and 
peaked at nearly 70[%] in 1944, when unemployment finally fell to 1[%].”
Shelby D. Green, Disquiet on the Home Front: Disturbing Crises in the Nation’s Markets and 
Institutions, 30 PACE L. REV. 7, 35 n.130 (2009) [hereinafter Green, Disquiet on the Home 
Front] (quoting Lohr, supra note 4).
14 BEN S. BERNANKE, The Federal Reserve’s Response to the Financial Crisis, in THE 
FEDERAL RESERVE AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 64, 87 (2013); see Robert Rich, The Great 
Recession December 2007–June 2009, FED. RES. HIST. (Nov. 22, 2013), 
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/great_recession_of_200709.
15 BERNANKE, supra note 14, at 87.
16 For comparison, in the fourth quarter of 2007, 3.6% of all United States residential 
mortgages and 20.4% of adjustable-rate subprime mortgages had been delinquent for at least 
ninety days. Wheelock, The Federal Response, supra note 8, at 138–39.
17 Id. at 138.
18 Id.
19 Id.
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol66/iss3/5
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a maturity of thirty years, these investments were risky because they either carried 
adjustable interest rates or were taken out by borrowers whose creditworthiness was 
marginal at best.20 Also, in many cases, predatory lending practices induced borrowers 
to take out risky home loans, such as “interest only” mortgages that did not amortize 
the principal.21 Although mortgage-backed securities, based on pools of mortgages,
had been safely sold for half a century, they became increasingly risky as lenders failed 
to apply safe underwriting standards in originating loans.22 In both the Great 
Depression and the Great Recession, lenders offered the prospect of refinancing to 
borrowers; however, when the Great Recession happened, refinancing became nearly 
impossible,23 and high rates of commercial and investment bank failures contributed 
to the difficulty of refinancing.24 Moreover, strong evidence suggested that appraisals 
were routinely overinflated during the Great Recession.25
Between these two historic events, the federal housing agencies, including the 
Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) and the Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac” or “FHLMC”)—collectively referred to as 
government-sponsored enterprises (“GSEs”)—pursued goals that were heedless and 
not well-calculated for the long-term creation of housing opportunities and their own 
survival. Originally, the housing agencies’ role was to make housing available after 
the Great Depression, and their prudent practices worked to increase 
homeownership.26 However, in the years leading up to the Great Recession, the 
                                                          
20 FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 12 (2011).
21 The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission found
[n]early one-quarter of all mortgages made in the first half of 2005 were interest-only 
loans. During the same year, 68% of ‘option ARM’ loans originated by Countrywide 
and Washington Mutual had low- or no-documentation requirements. . . . [Originators] 
believed they could off-load their risks [inherent in these devices] to the next person in 
line.
Id. xxiii–iv.
22 BERNANKE, supra note 14, at 67.
23 David C. Wheelock, Changing the Rules: State Mortgage Foreclosure Moratoria During 
the Great Depression, 90 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 569, 572 (2008) [hereinafter 
Wheelock, Changing the Rules].
24 Id.
25 Wheelock, The Federal Response, supra note 8, at 142. “[There was] an erosion of 
standards of responsibility and ethics that exacerbated the financial crisis.” FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY 
COMM’N, supra note 20, at xxii. The rate of “borrowers who defaulted on their mortgages within 
. . . months after [closing] . . . nearly doubled from the summer of 2006 to late 2007.” Id. This 
meant borrowers likely took out loans that they neither could nor intended to repay. Id.
“[M]ortgage brokers . . . were paid ‘yield spread premiums’ by lenders” as rewards for 
“put[ting] borrowers into higher-cost loans . . . .” Id. Mortgage fraud thrived in the absence of 
sound “lending standards and [on the platform of] lax regulation.” Id. Creditors made 
improvident “loans that they knew borrowers could not afford and that could cause massive 
losses to investors in mortgage securities.” Id. Yet all the while, creditors were selling securities 
based on these loans. Id.
26 FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 20, at 38 (noting that GSE stands for 
“government-sponsored enterprises”).
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housing agencies’ improvident practices in the secondary markets provided the 
platform for the excesses that led to the economic crisis.27 While the names of the 
actors and the government’s acts in the way of rescue and inventions to heal28 were 
                                                          
27 Id. at 418.
28 See Robert J. Samuelson, Rethinking the Great Recession, WILSON Q., Winter 2011, at 
16 [hereinafter Samuelson, Rethinking the Great Recession]. Samuelson offers an insightful 
analysis of the causes and a prescription for averting a similar event. He believes that the 
economic conditions created in the early 1980s—double digit inflation, with “steady and 
dependable prosperity,” and soaring stock market values after inflation fell—contributed to the 
economic bust. Id. Rising house prices led to more borrowing and spending, which served as a 
catalyst for more economic activity. Id. Everyone suspended belief that the prosperity could 
end, and a “get-rich-quick climate” emerged. Id. But, prevailing economic theory was flawed 
to the extent that it ignored the basic proposition that “too much prosperity enjoyed for too long 
tends to destroy itself. . . . [P]eriodic recessions and burst bubbles—at least those of modest 
proportions—serve a social purpose by reminding people of [the] economic and financial 
hazards and by rewarding prudence.” Id. at 17–18 “[G]reed, deregulation, misaligned pay 
incentives and mindless devotion to ‘free markets’ and ‘efficient markets’ theory” created an 
“orgy of risk taking, unrestrained either by self-imposed prudence or sensible government 
oversight.” Id. at 18. 
[Lenders] relaxed lending standards for home mortgages because they were not holding 
them but passing them on to investment bankers, who packaged them in increasingly 
arcane securities, which were then bought by other investment entities (pension funds, 
hedge funds, foreign banks). These investors were . . . reassured . . . [by the] high ratings 
from agencies such as Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch.
Id. “The result was a mountain of bad debt that had to collapse, to the great peril of the entire 
financial system and the economy.” Id. Many blamed the government as it encouraged risk 
“through a series of interventions in financial markets” (e.g., rescuing Long Term Capital 
Management) and by “keeping interest rates too low” Id. In answering the question, “[w]hy did 
the system spin out of control,” he shows that there were many to blame: the regulators—
including the Federal Reserve and the Office of Thrift Supervision—did not see the over 
extension by Citigroup and Bank of America or Washington Mutual, which famously imploded. 
Id. at 19. “Fannie [Mae] and Freddie [Mac] were [also] regulated,” but on loose leashes. Id.
Although greed was widespread, greed is always present and is not a crime. Id. While many 
banks offloaded bad mortgages, many kept them (Merrill Lynch, Bear Stearns, Wachovia, 
Lehman Brothers) and were done in by them. Id. The “moral hazard” was not a significant 
factor, as there was no way for any actor to know who would be helped; Lehman Brothers was 
allowed to fail and share prices declined precipitously. Id.
In the end, he believes that irrational optimism is largely to blame: 
[P]aradoxically, the reduction of risk [such as lower inflation, declining interest rates, 
increasing share prices, and job stability] prompted Americans to take on more risk. 
From 1995 to 2007, household debt grew from 92[%] to 138[%] of disposable income. 
Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and other[s] . . . became heavily dependent on short-
term loans that underpinned leverage ratios of 30 to 1 or more. 
Id. at 22. That is, “$30 of loans for every $1 of shareholder capital.[] Economists and 
government regulators became complacent and permissive. Optimism became self-fulfilling 
and self-reinforcing.” Id. At the same time, “wealth expanded so rapidly that their net worth . . 
. increased . . . from $11 trillion to $53 trillion.” Id. “[F]inancial positions looked stronger.” Id.
There were higher loan values because of high home values. But the “system became more 
fragile and vulnerable.” Id. In his view, the idea that bubbles and cycles can be avoided is a 
myth. The tools to avert another economic crisis include more regulation: banks should be 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol66/iss3/5
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slightly different, the mien of the GSEs underwent a transmogrification—from 
solicitude to punishing for the less well-off homeowner.29
When the GSEs faced collapse, a new overseer, the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency (“FHFA”), corralled them.30 The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 
2008 (“HERA”) created the FHFA.31 HERA invested FHFA with expansive powers 
over the GSEs’ purchasing power to stop the accumulation of new debt32 and to limit 
their liability exposure by shielding them from foreclosure or levy.33 While FHFA 
publicly assured the markets of the continuation of policies calculated to preserve 
homeownership, it quietly adopted severe policies that were inimical to that end.34 The 
GSEs moved to get rid of troublesome non-performing loans, thereby leaving 
foreclosed homeowners at the mercy of investor purchasers.35 Further, the GSEs 
refused to resell foreclosed properties to their former owners for less than amounts 
owed from the original loan.36
These self-preservation measures are disturbing, not only on account of the 
duplicity of the government agencies created to promote homeownership 
opportunities while simultaneously adopting policies that impaired such opportunities, 
but also because the measures evince an abandonment of the historical mission of the 
GSEs. In the end, the housing agencies were not interested in preserving housing; 
instead, the goal was to protect the federal fiscal status. While the policies adopted by 
an agency are largely left to its discretion, the judiciary or the legislature can check 
these agencies’ policies when they transgress the law,37 such as when the housing 
agencies’ policies violate the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution 
and the Fair Housing Act.
                                                          
“required to hold more capital as a cushion against losses”; the government should be allowed 
“to shut large failing financial institutions . . . without resorting to the disruptive bankruptcy”; 
and, there must be fewer bailouts. Id. at 23–24. The overall prescription is to move away from 
“unfettered competition [in the marketplace] toward more government oversight,” contain 
greed, and tax the greedy. Id. at 24.
29 See id. at 16–24.
30 See 12 U.S.C. § 1703 (2017).
31 Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654 
(codified at scattered sections of 12, 15, 26, 37, 38, 42 U.S.C.).
32 This also meant lopping off the management heads of the GSEs.
33 Housing and Economic Recovery Act, 122 Stat. at 2766.
34 FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 20, at 518–19.
35 Ken Xuhao Zhang, GSE NPL Sales Programs: Five Questions to Ask Before Investing 
in Non-Performing Loans, RISKSPAN (June 13, 2017), https://www.riskspan.com/news-insight-
blog/gse-npl-sales-programs-investing-in-non-performing-loans.
36 Iulia Filip, MA Sues Fannie & Freddie over Foreclosures, CFLA (June 8, 2014), 
http://www.certifiedforensicloanauditors.com/articles/06.14/ma-sues-fannie-and-freddie-over-
foreclosures.html.
37 JARED P. COLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44699, AN INTRODUCTION TO JUDICIAL 
REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCY ACTION summary (2016), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44699.pdf.
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This Article explores the impacts of the self-preservation policies adopted by the 
GSEs after the Great Recession, outlines the early constitutional challenges made to 
these policies, and suggests avenues for holding the GSEs accountable. Section II
provides background on the events that led to the GSEs’ near collapse and compares 
the events to those precipitating the Great Depression. Section III describes the 
retrenchment by the GSEs when the Great Recession set in. Section IV analyzes the 
challenges to the GSEs’ new policies and advances possible avenues for successful 
challenges to these policies. Section V offers conclusions on going forward.
II. GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS AFTER THE FIRST CRISIS
During the Great Depression, federal, state, and local governments intervened in a 
myriad of ways to revive the ailing economic and housing markets.38 President 
Franklin Roosevelt’s “New Deal” aimed to create confidence in the markets to 
encourage entrepreneurs and individuals to venture back in.39 Under the New Deal 
programs, industries produced goods bought by laborers who were hired to construct 
bridges and were paid a decent wage.40 Artisans painted murals on government office 
buildings to inspire citizens and memorialize American history.41 Banks were 
monitored against risky investments.42 Mortgages were backed with a federal 
guarantee to encourage banks to lend, and markets developed to trade in these 
mortgages.43 In this Article, I focus particularly on this last measure.
A. Moratoria, Mortgage Insurance, and Federal Banking
The seemingly implausible rate of foreclosures in the 1930s would surely have 
reached higher levels but for state-imposed moratoria and other limits on home 
foreclosures and the federal government’s intervention to refinance delinquent 
mortgages.44 Approximately twenty-eight states halted the remarkable rate of 
foreclosures through moratoria,45 and the federal government interfered with the 
                                                          
38 Bradford A. Lee, The New Deal Reconsidered, WILSON Q., Spring 1982, 62, 67.
39 Id. at 65.
40 RICHARD WALKER, THE NEW DEAL IN BRIEF (2012), https://livingnewdeal.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/01/New-Deal-in-Brief.pdf.
41 Lee, supra note 38, at 67.
42 Among other measures adopted to guard against risky banking practices was the Glass-
Steagall Act. The Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162, repealed by Financial 
Services Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338; see Julia Maues, 
Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall), FED. RES. HIST. (Nov. 22, 2013), 
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/glass_steagall_act.
43 Wheelock, The Federal Response, supra note 8, at 133–34.
44 Id. at 139.
45 Id. “There is much debate about the wisdom and efficacy of moratoria.” Green, Disquiet 
on the Home Front, supra note 13, at 32–33. The opposing arguments were that “foreclosure 
moratoria make loans costlier” (higher interest rates “to compensate for the added risks 
associated with an inability to foreclose”) and also “more difficult to obtain” (lenders restrict 
the supply of loans). Id. at 33 (emphasis added). At the same time, lenders benefit from 
moratoria because high foreclosure rates reduce property values, prompting still more 
foreclosures, that hurt lenders. A moratorium might halt the downward spiral in property values. 
Wheelock, Changing the Rules, supra note 23, at 580. Wheelock suggests that the states ignored 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol66/iss3/5
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housing market in other ways. For example, to shore up housing markets, the 
Roosevelt-era Congress authorized the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (“RFC”)46
to purchase stock in 6,000 banks at a cost of $1.3 billion, which equates to roughly 
$200 billion in today’s currency.47 In addition, the government implemented other 
remedial measures, such as bank deposit insurance and disclosure requirements for 
securities issuers.48 The Federal Home Loan Bank System established twelve regional 
Federal Home Loan Banks to provide a ready source of funds to member firms for 
residential-mortgage and economic-development loans.49 The government entered the 
housing market directly through the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (“HOLC”), 
which purchased and refinanced distressed mortgages on family homes that were 
subject to income and loan qualifications.50 Between August 1933 and June 1936, 
HOLC issued over one million loans.51 However, HOLC was liquidated in 1951.52
The National Housing Act of 1934 created the Federal Housing Administration 
(“FHA”) to encourage the making of home loans by providing mortgage insurance.53
The program required mortgage loan terms that were longer—e.g., thirty years—and 
did not involve a balloon payment after only five years.54 This made loan servicing 
more predictable and manageable.55 The program required mortgage loans to be fully 
                                                          
this reality on the belief that unrestricted foreclosures would have resulted in many people 
becoming homeless simultaneously. And these moratoria were also an expedient to buy time 
while the economy recovered. Id. at 580–81.
46 Wheelock, The Federal Response, supra note 8, at 140.
47 Green, Disquiet on the Home Front, supra note 13, at 35.
48 Wheelock, The Federal Response, supra note 8, at 140.
49 Id.
50 Id. The HOLC is revered as highly successful, and it achieved this success at low 
taxpayer cost—only an “initial $200 million capitalization, which it eventually repaid.” Id. at 
146. “HOLC purchased some one million loans [from their originators], which it refinanced as 
long-term, fixed rate, [fully] amortizing loans payable in monthly installments.” Id. Although it 
purchased only delinquent loans, it “ended up foreclosing on fewer than 20[%] of the loans it 
refinanced.” Id.; see id. at 134. “The HOLC was not quick to foreclose on delinquent loans, 
being ‘as considerate of delinquent but deserving borrowers as its responsibility to the Federal 
Government and the taxpaying public [would] permit.’” Id. at 142 (quoting FED. HOME LOAN
BD., THIRD ANN. REP. 600 (1935)). “The HOLC often counseled delinquent borrowers and 
readjusted payment schedules rather than moving quickly to foreclosure when borrowers fell 
behind on their payments. On average, HOLC loans were delinquent for two years before 
foreclosure.” Id. (citing FED. HOME LOAN BD., 1951 ANN. REP. 73 (1951)).
51 Wheelock, The Federal Response, supra note 8, at 140.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Federal National Mortgage Association Charter Act, Pub. L. No. 83–560, tit. II, 68 Stat. 
590, 612–22 (1954) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1716–23(j) (2017)) (creating “Fannie 
Mae” and defining its functions); see 12 U.S.C. §§ 1451–59 (2017) (defining “Freddie Mac”); 
Shelby D. Green, The Search for a National Land Use Policy: For the Cities’ Sake, 26 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 69, 85 n.103 (1998) [hereinafter Green, The Search] (“Fannie Mae was 
established to draw more funds into the residential housing market, to redistribute these funds 
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amortizing and set a maximum allowable interest rate of 5%.56 At first, FHA-insured 
loans had to be $16,000 or less (at a time when the median house price was $5,304) 
and had to have a maximum loan-to-value ratio of 80%.57 But in 1938, FHA raised 
that loan-to-value ratio to 90% for new homes with mortgages of no more than 
$5,400.58 The FHA had authorization to charge an annual insurance premium between 
0.5% and 1.0% of the outstanding loan principal.59 The early impact in the market was 
modest; for some lenders, FHA insurance did not outweigh the advantages of balloon 
payments, higher loan amounts, and interest rates.60 By 1938, FHA-insured loans 
represented less than 20% of all new mortgage originations.61
B. National Housing Act and the Secondary Market
To provide liquidity necessary for spreading homeownership, the economy needed 
a market for mortgages. The National Housing Act of 1934 created the national 
mortgage associations for this purpose, establishing the secondary market for 
mortgages to be bought and securitized.62 The RFC formed two subsidiaries to 
purchase FHA-insured mortgages: (1) the RFC Mortgage Company, established in 
1935, and (2) Fannie Mae, established in 1938.63 Soon, Fannie Mae became the 
principal government purchaser of FHA-insured loans. In its first year, Fannie Mae 
purchased approximately $82 million of mortgages; this number rose to $207 million 
in 1941, which was approximately 1% of the total outstanding mortgages on single-
to four-family homes.64
A 1948 amendment to the National Housing Act of 1934 gave Fannie Mae a 
federal charter to break off from the RFC and the authority to purchase FHA- and 
                                                          
regionally, and to insulate housing markets from monetary and fiscal policy. Freddie Mac was 
established as a subsidiary to the Federal Home Loan Bank System to create a pass-through 
program for conventional mortgages. Additionally, the federal government also purchases 
mortgages made by private lenders through the Government National Mortgage Association 
(“Ginnie Mae”), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1716–23(h).”). “‘Ginnie Mae buys and packages FHA/VA-
insured mortgages and sells them directly to investors, creating a “pass-through” by 
guaranteeing principal and interest to the ultimate investor and servicing fees to the originator.’” 
Id. (quoting Lily M. Hoffman & Barbara S. Heisler, Home Finance: Buying and Keeping a 
House in a Changing Financial Environment, in HANDBOOK OF HOUSING, AND THE BUILT 
ENVIRONMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 149, 152–53 (Elizabeth Huttman & William Van Vliet 
eds., 1988) (citations omitted)). “The Homeownership Assistance Program provides mortgage 
insurance for the purchase of one to four family homes, authorizes down payments as low as 
$200 and subsidizes the interest paid by qualified low-income homebuyers on their mortgage 
loans, reducing interest rates to as low as 1% per year.” Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1715(z) (1998)).
56 Wheelock, The Federal Response, supra note 8, at 144.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 See id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 145.
64 Id.
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Veterans Administration- (“VA”) insured loans.65 In 1968, Congress chartered Fannie 
Mae as a government-sponsored private corporation66 with an initial capitalization of 
$10 million.67 To facilitate its mortgage purchasing activities, Congress authorized 
Fannie Mae to sell bonds to investors.68 These bonds were thought to carry the implicit 
guarantee of the federal government because FHA-insured mortgages comprised 
almost all of Fannie Mae’s portfolio.69
Freddie Mac was established in 1970 as part of the Federal Home Loan Bank 
System.70 Together, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac created a robust secondary market 
for mortgages and set standards for efficient operation. Mortgage instruments became 
standardized, prepayment premiums were eliminated, and down payment amounts 
were fixed.71
C.  Interventions After the 2008 Crisis: From Predictability to Volatility
Through GSEs, the rate of homeownership rose to just under 70% of all 
households, and housing prices rose steadily over the decades.72 However, the 
prolonged period of prosperity from the late 1970s to the 1990s spurred the desire for 
more borrowing, more profits, and more risks. To satiate these wants, lenders 
introduced housing market participants to common practice standards and devices that 
made borrowing easier, but were more unpredictable and ultimately more 
burdensome.73 The more notorious of these practices were the adjustable rate mortgage 
(“ARM”) and the interest-only payment mortgage, which made homeownership 
possible for a short time but only promised doom.74 That doom came in the ARM case 
when the increasing interest rates caused concomitant rises in mortgage payments, 
sometimes in multiples of the original amounts. In the case of the interest-only 
mortgage, that doom came when the principal came due and the loan’s principal had 
not been reduced since loan origination.75 This scenario was even more scandalous 
                                                          
65 Id. at 140.
66 See N. ERIC WEISS & KATIE JONES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42995, AN OVERVIEW OF 
THE HOUSING FINANCE SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (2017); see also Green, Disquiet on the 
Home Front, supra note 13, at 17.
67 Wheelock, The Federal Response, supra note 8, at 145.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 WEISS & JONES, supra note 66, at 9.
71 Robin Paul Malloy, The Secondary Mortgage Market—A Catalyst for Change in Real 
Estate Transactions, 39 SW. L.J. 991, 994 (1986).
72 Green, Disquiet on the Home Front, supra note 13, at 13; Samuelson, Rethinking the 
Great Recession, supra note 28, at 16.
73 FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 20, at 16.
74 Id.
75 Green, Disquiet on the Home Front, supra note 13, at 10; see Justin Pritchard, Learn the 
Pros and Cons of Adjustable Rate Mortgages, BALANCE (Nov. 7, 2017), 
https://www.thebalance.com/adjustable-rate-mortgages-315667 (discussing ARMs); Elizabeth 
Weintraub, Pros and Cons to an Interest Only Mortgage, BALANCE (Nov. 26, 2016), 
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after the realization that many of the defaulting borrowers could not afford their loans 
in the first place; they received mortgages from low- or no-documentation loans where 
creditworthiness was not assessed.76 The practice was curious—borrowers with no 
established income or ability to repay received large loans based on inflated appraisals 
with high interest rates.77 At the height of the housing crisis, loan defaults occurred at 
an alarming rate, and banks scheduled millions of foreclosures.78 Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac held millions of mortgages in their portfolios, a very high percentage of 
which were thought to be risky or of poor quality.79
Unlike Nero,80 the government could not sit idle while many of its venerable
financial institutions teetered on the verge of demise. Instead, the government’s 
response was massive.81 Some commentators assert the response lacked a 
comprehensive systemic vision, instead unfolding as a series of deals as individual 
catastrophes emerged—the decision to facilitate the acquisition of Bear Stearns by JP 
Morgan, the purchase of Merrill Lynch by Bank of America, the nationalization of 
AIG, and, paradoxically, the decision to let Lehman Brothers fail.82 The response 
included macro-level monetary and regulatory policies: the Federal Reserve opened 
its discount window to banks that it did not oversee, specifically to the seventeen 
institutions that the New York Federal Reserve listed “as ‘primary dealers’ in 
government securities that reported their statistics to the Federal Reserve”;83 the 
Federal Reserve and Treasury received enhanced powers for bank regulation; the 
target rate for federal funds and the discount rate decreased by almost half;84 and the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) addressed the housing-
specific aspects of the crisis under HERA.85
                                                          
https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-an-interest-only-mortgage-1798407 (discussing interest-
only payments mortgages).
76 See Green, Disquiet on the Home Front, supra note 13, at 10.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 37.
79 Arnold Kling, The Financial Crisis: Moral Failure or Cognitive Failure?, 33 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 507, 509 (2010) (discussing the decisions by the GSEs to ignore risks as they 
pursued greater profits).
80 See generally Bruce Bartlett, How Excessive Government Killed Ancient Rome, 14 CATO 
J. 287, 294–95 (1994). 
81 Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s Response 
to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 465 (2009).
82 Id. at 480, 494.
83 Id. at 484.
84 Id. The federal funds rate went “from 2.25% to 1.5% and the discount rate [dropped] 
from 2.5% to 1.75%.” Id.
85 Housing and Economic Recovery Act, 122 Stat. at 2654.
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1.  Rescue of the GSEs for Stability of the Markets
In theory, HERA provided $300 billion in aid to qualified subprime homebuyers 
and poised the GSEs as principal actors in engineering a housing recovery.86 By its 
terms, HERA set out five large goals.87 The first goal was to assist the GSEs to survive 
undercapitalization by closely monitoring their activities, placing restrictions on their 
asset growth, and requiring prior approval of any new acquisition and activities.88 The 
second goal was to provide relief to lenders and borrowers through the HOPE for 
Homeowners Act (the “Act”), a voluntary plan to avoid foreclosure by refinancing 
loans (where in exchange for reducing loan debt to no greater than 90% of appraised 
value, lenders in turn waived all prepayment penalties, default fees, delinquent fees, 
and subordination liens).89 Pursuant to the Act, the federal government would insure 
the new loans and was entitled to most of the equity upon a sale of the property during 
the early years of the program.90 The third goal aimed to stabilize the housing market 
through new tax credits for homebuyers,91 support for redevelopment of abandoned 
properties,92 and support for real estate investment.93 The fourth goal was to remedy 
the social consequences of foreclosures by expanding housing stock, with the GSEs 
leading by using flexible underwriting, making grants to local development agencies, 
slowing the foreclosure process for individuals serving in the military (and increasing 
the maximum loan guarantees to up to 125% of median area price), and promoting 
external increases in property value by developing and maintaining abandoned 
properties.94 The fifth goal was to prevent a future housing crisis.95 HERA attempted 
to prevent a new crisis through the creation of FHFA to oversee the GSEs,96 expanding 
government-backed financing options for homebuyers, allowing for 3.5% down-
payment,97 adopting the Secure and Fair Enforcement of Mortgage Lending Act 
                                                          
86 12 U.S.C. § 1721 (2008).
87 Id. § 4561.
88 Id. § 4715(a)(2)(1).
89 Id. § 1715z-23(b)(1)–(2).
90 Id. §§ 1715z-23(b)(1)–(2), (d), (e)(1)(3).
91 26 U.S.C.§ 3002–05 (2008); Housing and Economic Recovery Act, 122 Stat. at 2879–
86 (granting tax credits under this authority up to $7,500).
92 The Act set aside $4 billion for low- and moderate-income housing.
93 26 U.S.C. § 3012(b) (2008); Housing and Economic Recovery Act, 122 Stat. at 2892.
94 12 U.S.C. § 4565(d)(2)(a) (2008); Housing and Economic Recovery Act, 122 Stat. at 
2705.
95 Housing and Economic Recovery Act, 122 Stat. at 2840.
96 12 U.S.C. § 1703 (2008).
97 Id. § 1454(a)(2). The expanded financing options changed loan limits, which started at 
$417,000 for single-family homes and increased for certain high-cost regions. Id. The allowance 
of 3.5% down-payments also did not include the financing of down-payments. Id.
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(“SAFE”) for regulating mortgage brokers,98 and amending the Truth in Lending Act 
(“TILA”) to require additional disclosures to borrowers.99
Congress enacted HERA just in time, as the GSEs were failing.100 Together, Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac owned or guaranteed more than $4 trillion in home mortgages, 
nearly half of which were outstanding.101 On September 5, 2008, government auditors 
discovered that the accounting records of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac significantly 
overstated their capital; instead of a sound fiscal base, the programs were technically 
insolvent without any obvious remedy.102 FHFA exercised the powers conferred by 
HERA and placed the GSEs under conservatorship.103 This move meant that the 
federal government became the owner or guarantor of approximately 42% of 
American mortgages, a number that was growing in size and scope.104 The Treasury 
Secretary at the time, Henry Paulson, decided to shrink the portfolios of retained 
mortgage and mortgage-backed securities to approximately $850 billion by December 
31, 2009; through a 10% decline per year, he hoped to reach an ultimate goal of an 
asset portfolio of $250 billion for each GSE.105 At the same time, the mortgage markets 
did not announce wholesale withdrawal of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.106 Instead, 
the government made a public announcement concerning its commitment to grow 
these institutions over the next fifteen months to provide assistance to the housing 
markets.107 As is the subject of this Article, the measures adopted only served to 
frustrate the promise to grow the GSEs.
                                                          
98 Secure and Fair Enforcement for Mortgage Licensing Act of 2008 (“S.A.F.E. Act”), Pub. 
L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2810 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5101 et seq. and implemented through 
regulations 12 C.F.R. §§ 1007–08).
99 15 U.S.C § 1601 (2008). For a thorough description of HERA, see Bruce Arthur, Recent 
Development: Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 585 (2009).
100 See OFFICE OF FED. HOUS. ENTER. OVERSIGHT, A PRIMER ON THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE
MARKET 1 (2008).
101 Id. at 2.
102 Gretchen Morgenson & Charles Duhigg, Mortgage Giant Overstated Size of Its Capital 
Base, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2008, at Al.
103 Id.
104 The figure is as of September 30, 2008. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 0-50231, SEPT. 2008
Q. REP. 9 (2008), http://www.fanniemae.com/resources/file/ir/pdf/quarterly-annual-
results/2008/q32008.pdf.
105 OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FACT SHEET: TREASURY SENIOR 
PREFERRED STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT 30 (2008), https://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Documents/pspa_factsheet_090708%20hp1128.pdf.
106 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Statement by Secretary Henry M. Paulson 
Jr. on Treasury and Federal Housing Finance Agency Action to Protect Financial Markets and 
Taxpayers (Sept. 7, 2008), http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hpl 129.htm.
107 Id.
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2. Propping Up the Banks
When the crisis began to impact the financial markets, Congress enacted the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”)108 under the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008 (“EESA”).109 The aim of TARP was to support Wall Street 
and to avoid a cascading effect from failures from across other parts of the economy.110
However, these efforts came too late; the stock markets were already roiling, 
unemployment was already soaring, and GDP was already halted.111 Nevertheless, 
many viewed the efforts as a “bailout” of the banks whose own greed precipitated the 
financial crisis.112 While many banks received TARP funds, two in particular, 
Citigroup and Bank of America, were seen as “systemically significant”—meaning 
“too big to fail”—and received significant capital infusions.113 At the heart “of EESA 
was the authorization of up to $700 billion to fund TARP.”114 At first, the government 
only committed $475 billion, with $245 billion allocated to investments in bank 
capital.115 Of the latter number, TARP expended $204.9 billion to buy preferred stock 
in banks under the Capital Purchase Program (“CPP”).116 Under Treasury Department 
rules, no financial institution could receive more than $25 billion under the CPP.117
Yet, the bulk of the initial CPP funds—about $125 billion—went to nine of the largest 
financial institutions.118
                                                          
108 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 § 101, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 
3765, 3767 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5211); see Green, Disquiet on the Home Front, supra note 
13, at 12 n.22.
109 12 U.S.C. § 5201 (2008); Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 122 Stat. at 
3765.
110 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 122 Stat. at 3767.
111 See supra text accompanying note 14.
112 Lissa Lamkin Broome, The Dodd-Frank Act: TARP Bailout Backlash and Too Big to 
Fail, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 69, 69 (2011).
113 Id.
114 Id. at 70.
115 OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLE ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, SIG-
QR-10-04, OCT. 2010 Q. REP. CONG. 43 (2010) [hereinafter SIGTARP Q. REP.]; Broome, supra
note 112, at 70–71.
116 SIGTARP Q. REP., supra note 115, at 45.
117 Capital Purchase Program: Program Purpose & Overview, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY,
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/bank-investment-
programs/cap/Pages/overview.aspx (last updated Oct. 16, 2015).
118 Those nine financial institutions were: Citigroup ($25 billion), JPMorgan Chase & Co. 
($25 billion), Wells Fargo & Company ($25 billion), Bank of America Corporation ($15 billion 
plus $10 billion from Merrill Lynch), The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. ($10 billion), Morgan 
Stanley ($10 billion), The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation ($3 billion), and State Street 
Corporation ($2 billion). U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM (TARP)
MONTHLY 105(A) REP.—DEC. 2010 app. 2 (2011).
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3.  Help for Homeowners
While some banks were too big to fail, this was not the case for the hapless 
homeowner whose folly or naivety, not unlike that which animated the big banks, led 
them to mortgages they could not afford. Rather than providing cash assistance to 
bring their mortgages current, the Administration adopted the Home Affordable 
Refinance Program (“HARP”), which allowed for the refinancing of existing Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac loans up to 125% of the current value of the home.119
Additionally, the Home Affordable Modification Program (“HAMP”) aimed “to 
reduce delinquent and at-risk borrowers’ monthly mortgage payments” through loss-
mitigation alternatives, such as loan modifications, that extended the term of the loan 
or reduced the loan’s interest rate to make monthly payments manageable.120
a. New Federal Underwriting Standards
Other federal agencies, which were able to step back and assess the systemic ills 
of the lending industry, attacked the crisis from the front end—loan origination.121
Among other things, the Federal Reserve Board adopted amendments to Regulation Z 
of TILA.122 Recognizing that “the low- or no-documentation loans contributed to the 
burgeoning default rates and subsequent housing crisis by providing high-priced 
mortgages to high-risk borrowers,” the Regulation Z amendments included enhanced 
disclosures to borrowers on higher-priced mortgage loans and restrictions on certain 
proven onerous features, such as balloon payments and prepayment penalties.123 The 
amendments prohibit deceptive advertising, influence by lenders and brokers on 
appraisers, and unfair servicing practices by servicers as related to fees and billing.124
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-
Frank”), adopted in July 2010, includes comprehensive measures on investment 
banking and substantial measures regulating mortgage lending.125 Dodd-Frank created 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) to ensure fairness in consumer
transactions.126 Lenders are now required to ensure that the borrower has the ability to 
repay and delineates “qualified mortgage[s]”—“which are mortgages with safe 
                                                          
119 See HARP Refinancing Program—Check Your HARP Eligibility, LENDERS NETWORK,
https://thelendersnetwork.com/harp-program-refinance-loan (last visited Feb. 8, 2018). 
120 Abigail Lawlis Kuzma, Foreclosure in the Heartland: What Did We Learn?, 49 VAL. U.
L. REV. 39 (2014) (describing the mechanics as well as the profound failures of the programs, 
including that from administrative negligence and carelessness).
121 Daniel Wagner, Subprime Lending Execs Back in Business Five Years After Crash, CTR.
PUB. INTEGRITY (Sept. 11, 2013), https://www.publicintegrity.org/2013/09/11/13327/subprime-
lending-execs-back-business-five-years-after-crash.
122 See Truth in Lending; Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,521, 44,522 (July 30, 2008) (to be 
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226).
123 Id.; Kuzma, supra note 120, at 53.
124 Truth in Lending, supra note 122, at 44,563, 44,586–90.
125 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301 et seq.).
126 Id. at 1964–2035.
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underwriting practices, lower fees, and an absence of risky features”127—as a “safe 
harbor.”128 The safe harbor is “a conclusive presumption that [the mortgage] satisfied 
ability-to-pay requirements and a rebuttable presumption for higher-priced mortgage 
loans . . . .”129 In making loans, lenders must “verify the borrower’s income and ensure 
the borrower has the ability to repay the loan over its full term” rather than only at the 
initial rate in the case of an adjustable rate mortgage.130 “[L]enders must provide a 
good faith estimate of the amount the monthly payment will be after it adjusts or 
resets”131 and must provide “six months’ notice before the mortgage interest rate resets 
from a fixed to a variable rate . . . .”132 “Dodd-Frank also prohibits steering incentives 
and yield spread premiums, which are ‘payments made by a lender to a mortgage 
broker upon origination for placing the borrower in a loan with riskier terms . . . or a 
higher interest rate than the minimum rate required by the lender.’”133
Dodd-Frank prohibits “prepayment penalties for adjustable rate and higher cost 
mortgages that are not ‘qualified mortgage[s]’” and prohibits a lender from offering 
“a fixed rate qualified loan with a prepayment penalty without also offering the 
                                                          
127 Kuzma, supra note 120, at 53 (citing Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, 124 Stat. at 2145–48). “On January 30, 2013 and June 12, 2013, the CFPB 
issued final regulations amending Regulation Z and implementing the ability-to-repay and 
qualified mortgage standards effective January 10, 2014.” Id. at 53 n.93 (citing Ability-to-Repay 
and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 
35,430–35,506 (June 12, 2013) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026); Ability-to-Repay and Qualified 
Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 6408–20
(Jan. 30, 2013) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026)).
128 Id. at 54.
129 Id. at 55; see id. at 54 n.94 (citing Qualified Mortgage Definition for HUD Insured and 
Guaranteed Single Family Mortgages, 78 Fed. Reg. 59,890 (Sept. 30, 2013) (codified at 24 
C.F.R. pts. 201, 203, 1005, 1007)). “In October 2014, federal agencies loosened regulations to 
increase the flow of housing credit. ‘The government is in a tight spot. Some six years after the 
financial crisis, thousands of apparently creditworthy borrowers are being shut out of the 
housing market because they cannot get mortgages.’” Id. (quoting Peter Eavis, U.S. Loosens 
Reins, but Mortgage Lenders Want More Slack, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2014), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/22/u-s-loosens-reins-but-mortgage-lenders-want-more-
slack/).
130 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a) (2018); Kuzma, supra note 120, at 54.
131 Kuzma, supra note 120, at 55 (citing Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, 124 Stat. at 2154).
132 Id. (citing Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 124 Stat. at 
2154, 2178–81).
133 Id. at 54, 54 n.95 (quoting Linda Singer et al., Breaking Down Financial Reform: A 
Summary of the Major Consumer Protection Portions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act, 14 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 2, 6 (2010)); see Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 124 Stat. at 2139–41 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
1639b (2010)). “Yield spread premiums have long been considered predatory because they 
‘provide[] a financial incentive for brokers to place borrowers into more expensive, and 
oftentimes typically more risky, mortgages’—the broker makes more money when he or she 
can convince the homeowner to purchase this less-desirable mortgage product.” Kuzma, supra
note 120, at 54, 54 n.96 (quoting Singer et al., supra, at 6).
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borrower a loan without a prepayment penalty.”134 Finally, Dodd-Frank places limits 
on the financing of worthless credit or other insurance into the mortgage’s principal.135
b. State Initiatives
A myriad of state laws now protect borrowers at the initial contracting stage, when 
the world changes, and when borrowers face foreclosure.136 Disclosures of loan costs, 
limits on terms of high-cost loans,137 required counseling, and advice before taking the 
loan all protect borrowers at loan origination.138 Mediation and settlement conferences 
before a foreclosure now avert foreclosure after default or enable time to cure 
default.139 In the first six months of 2008, the Massachusetts, Minnesota, and New 
York state legislatures considered legislation to impose moratoria on foreclosure, and 
state representatives introduced legislation for a national moratorium in Congress.140
                                                          
134 Kuzma, supra note 120, at 55 (citing Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, 124 Stat. at 2149–53).
135 Singer et al., supra note 133, at 7. “Before Dodd-Frank, it was common practice in the 
subprime market to charge exorbitant premiums for unnecessary insurance, such as credit 
insurance, and finance these premiums into the mortgage principal.” Kuzma, supra note 120, at 
55 n.105 (citing Singer et al., supra note 133, at 7); but see Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, 124 Stat. at 2151 (requiring residential mortgage loans to include 
credit unemployment insurance where “the unemployment insurance premiums are reasonable, 
the creditor receives no direct or indirect compensation in connection with the unemployment 
insurance premiums, and the unemployment insurance premiums are paid pursuant to another
insurance contract and not paid to an affiliate of the creditor.”). “Under Dodd-Frank, no 
residential mortgage loan secured by the homeowner’s principal dwelling may include 
financing of ‘any credit life, credit disability, credit unemployment, or credit property insurance, 
or any other accident, loss-of-income, life, or health insurance.’” Kuzma, supra note 120, at 55 
n.105 (quoting Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 124 Stat. at 
2149–50).
136 Shelby D. Green & JoAnn T. Sandifer, MERS Remains Afloat in a Sea of Foreclosures,
PROB. & PROP. July/August 2013, at 18.
137 See, e.g., N.Y. BANKING LAW § 6-l (McKinney 2018); LaSalle Bank, N.A. v. Shearon, 
850 N.Y.S.2d 871 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008) (canceling debt upon violations of banking law on high 
cost loan), aff’d on reh’g, 881 N.Y.S.2d 599 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009).
138 Kuzma, supra note 120, at 63.
139 See generally NEV. REV. STAT. § 107.086(3) (2011); ALON COHEN, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS, WALK THE TALK: BEST PRACTICES ON THE ROAD TO AUTOMATIC FORECLOSURE 
MEDIATION 2 (2010); GEOFFRY WALSH, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., STATE AND LOCAL 
FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS: CAN THEY SAVE HOMES? 30 (2009); Frank S. Alexander 
et al., Legislative Responses to the Foreclosure Crisis in Nonjudicial Foreclosure States, 31
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 341 (2011); Aleatra P. Williams, Foreclosing Foreclosure: Escaping 
the Yawning Abyss of the Deep Mortgage and Housing Crisis, 7 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 454 
(2012).
140 PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, DEFAULTING ON THE DREAM: STATES RESPOND TO AMERICA’S
FORECLOSURE CRISIS (2008). “In the summer of 2009, California imposed a ninety-day 
moratorium on foreclosure proceedings.” Alexander et al., supra note 139, at 365. “Many 
leaders in the last year have imposed voluntary moratoria on foreclosures.” Green, Disquiet on 
the Home Front, supra note 13, at 33 n.122. By one estimate, approximately half of all United 
States urban home mortgages were delinquent during the Great Depression as of January 1, 
1934. Id. “State and local governments responded by changing state laws governing foreclosure. 
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III. FROM SHORING UP TO SELF-PRESERVATION
The FHFA placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac under conservatorship141 after 
concluding that the GSEs could not fulfill their mission without government
intervention.142 Announcing the decision, the director of FHFA stated:
After this exhaustive review, I have determined that the companies cannot 
continue to operate safely and soundly and fulfill their critical public 
mission, without significant action to address our concerns, which are:
? the safety and soundness issues . . . including current capitalization;
? current market conditions;
? the financial performance and condition of each company;
? the inability of the companies to fund themselves according to normal 
practices and prices; and 
? the critical importance each company has in supporting the residential 
mortgage market in this country.
Therefore, in order to restore the balance between safety and soundness and 
mission, FHFA has placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into 
conservatorship. That is a statutory process designed to stabilize a troubled 
institution with the objective of returning the entities to normal business 
operations. FHFA will act as the conservator to operate the Enterprises until 
they are stabilized.143
At the time the conservatorship went into effect, the Treasury Department provided
$189.5 billion in support with an initial placement of $1 billion to both Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac as well as an additional cumulative $187.5 billion investment.144
The conferred powers and protections under HERA are broad, including 
exemptions for any property of FHFA from state, county, or local taxation145 and 
exemption from “levy, attachment, garnishment, foreclosure, or sale” without FHFA’s 
consent.146 The FHFA curtailed the GSEs’ borrowing capacity and “launched 
initiatives to recover losses that resulted from the housing crisis” to avoid further 
                                                          
These measures included enhancements of borrowers’ redemption rights and limiting deficiency 
judgments.” Id. (internal citations omitted); see Wheelock, Changing the Rules, supra note 23, 
at 574.
141 Under the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992, as
amended by HERA, FHFA has authorization to “take such action as may be: (i) necessary to put 
the regulated entity in a sound and solvent condition; and (ii) appropriate to carry on the business
of the regulated entity and preserve and conserve the assets and property of the regulated entity.” 
12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(2)(D)(i)–(ii) (2018).
142 Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, Statement of Director James B. Lockhart at News Conference 
Announcing Conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Sept. 7, 2008).
143 Id.
144 FHFA as Conservator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE 
AGENCY [hereinafter FHFA as Conservator].
145 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(2) (2018).
146 Id. § 4617(j)(3).
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liability.”147 The FHFA reduced the amount of outstanding repurchases and reduced the 
number of loans created under poor underwriting standards.148
Four years later, after the market began to settle, FHFA released the 2012 Strategic 
Plan for Enterprise Conservatorships.149 The plan “envisioned a new securitization
infrastructure to replace Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s . . . outdated infrastructures 
and attract private capital to share credit risk” that the GSEs previously took on 
alone.150 Section 4617 of HERA gave the FHFA not only the power to act as 
conservator or receiver, but also the power to reorganize, rehabilitate, or wind up the 
GSEs affairs.151 This “winding up” power is central to the FHFA’s activities and is of 
most concern.
A. The Tools of Self-Preservation
Purportedly, FHFA adopted these measures to help Wall Street and consumers 
survive the crisis. The measures acknowledged that there was enough blame to go 
around, but did not place the blame anywhere in particular. Rather, they applied funds 
and efforts best calculated to quell the roiling seas.152 To be sure, a conservatorship 
                                                          
147 FHFA as Conservator, supra note 144; History of Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac 
Conservatorships, FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY (2012) [hereinafter History of Fannie Mae],
https://www.fhfa.gov/Conservatorship/Pages/History-of-Fannie-Mae--Freddie-
Conservatorships.aspx (last visited Mar. 12, 2018).
148 FHFA as Conservator, supra note 144.
149 FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, STRATEGIC PLAN FOR ENTERPRISE CONSERVATORSHIPS 2 (2012)
[hereinafter FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, STRATEGIC PLAN].
150 FHFA as Conservator, supra note 144. “FHFA proposed a common platform that would 
support Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s existing business and upgrade their aging and
inflexible infrastructures . . . [to] save taxpayers the costs of maintaining and upgrading two 
parallel structures in the future.” Id. The Strategic Plan led to a white paper in October 2012 that 
proposed:
a framework for a common securitization platform and an improved contractual and
disclosure framework and requested public input. The white paper sought to identify the
core components (proposed as data validation, issuance, disclosure, bond administration,
and master servicing) of mortgage securitization that would be needed in the housing
finance system in the future. The securitization platform could be used by multiple issuers
to process payments and performother functions. 
Along with the white paper, FHFA joined Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac . . . in outreach to
a full range of stakeholders, including a variety of industry participants—small and large 
companies, trade groups, advocacy organizations, vendors, originators, servicers,
investors, and mortgage insurers . . . [—to solicit feedback] on the securitization platform
prototype, to align key contract features and practices, and address additional protections
investors require.
Id.; FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, WPR-2012-001, WHITE PAPER: FHFA-OIG’S CURRENT 
ASSESSMENT OF FHFA’S CONSERVATORSHIP OF FANNIE MAE & FREDDIE MAC (2012), 
https://www.fhfaoig.gov/Content/Files/WPR-2012-001.pdf.
151 12 U.S.C. § 4617(a)(2) (2018).
152 Christian E. Weller, 10 Reasons Why Public Policies Rescued the U.S. Economy, CTR.
FOR AM. PROGRESS (May 29, 2012),
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meant to stave off claims holds the potential to stabilize a turbulent event. However, 
it is the usual case that conservatorships are temporary measures adopted in the event 
of crisis,153 although in certain instances, such as in the case of a finite resource, they
can be permanent devices used to prevent complete dissipation or irretrievable 
diminutions in value or quantity.154 Nothing under HERA imposed any limits on the 
operation of FHFA as conservator of the GSEs or any requirements that their historic 
purposes be continued.155 Instead of working to stabilize the GSEs by fortifying their 
roles in the housing market, FHFA used them for restoring and recovering assets, even 
though such uses effectively diminished their impact and undermined the secondary 
market.156 Having invested nearly $200 billion—although far less than the government 
spent under TARP—the mission of the GSEs changed from its founding principle of 
furthering housing to a principle of self-preservation, a defeating and demoralizing 
position.157 This new face of the GSEs is most apparent in a number of policies adopted 
for handling nonperforming loans and foreclosed properties.
The self-protective stance continued long after the GSEs recovered financially. 
Four years after the crisis, the GSEs began making profits and repaying the Treasury 
many times over what Treasury had advanced to prop them up after the crisis.158 In a 
                                                          
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/news/2012/05/29/11593/10-reasons-why-
public-policies-rescued-the-u-s-economy.
153 Conservatorship, LEGAL DICTIONARY, https://legaldictionary.net/conservatorship (last 
visited Feb. 19, 2018).
154 History of Fannie Mae, supra note 147.
155 There has long been a push by some legislators to abolish the GSEs entirely. See, e.g.,
Nick Timiraos & Michael R. Crittenden, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac Should Be Eliminated, 
Frank Says, WALL. ST. J. (Jan. 22, 2010), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704509704575019162391608940 (detailing 
Rep. Barney Frank’s (D.–Mass.) calls to abolish GSEs).
156 FHFA as Conservator, supra note 144.
157 Id.
158 When the GSEs were placed in conservatorship in 2008, they were each given access to 
multi-billion-dollar lines of credit from the U.S. Treasury, to be repaid pursuant to a Senior 
Preferred Stock Agreement (“SPSA”). Jann Swanson, Unsealed Court Docs Paint
Fannie/Freddie as Congressional Cash Cow, MORTGAGE NEWS DAILY (July 25, 2017), 
http://www.mortgagenewsdaily.com/07252017_gse_conservatorship.asp. Under the SPSA, the 
U.S. Treasury received dollar-for-dollar shares of preferred stock along with a fixed quarterly 
dividend. Id. Over the course of four years under conservatorship, Fannie Mae had drawn 
$116.1 billion, and Freddie Mac had drawn $71.3 billion. Id. Yet, the GSEs absurdly continued 
to make quarterly draws, even after they had largely recovered, it seems, to make the quarterly 
dividend payment. Id. This deal was not satisfactory to the Treasury. “In late 2012, FHFA acting 
director Edward J. DeMarco and Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner announced they were 
amending the SPSA, replacing the dividend with a ‘net worth sweep’ that would take all of the 
companies’ net profits each quarter less a steadily decreasing buffer of capital.” Id. This would 
eventually leave the GSEs with no capital reserves. Id. DeMarco and Geithner gave two 
rationales for the change: first, under the existing agreement, borrowing and repayment was 
ridiculously circular—Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac constantly borrowed from the Treasury to 
pay stakeholders—“and second, the change would help preserve the remaining Treasury 
balance available to the GSEs in the event they needed them.” Id. As it stands, Fannie Mae 
having paid Treasury $159.9 billion in dividends and Freddie Mac having paid $105.9 billion, 
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deposition from pending litigation against the GSEs, Fannie Mae’s CFO revealed that 
“she had told Treasury officials on August 9, 2012 that [Fannie Mae] was ‘now in a 
sustainable profitability, that [Fannie Mae] would be able to deliver sustainable profits 
over time.’”159 Documents unsealed as part of the litigation contained ten years of 
“internal financial projections from Fannie [Mae], indicating that the company would 
not require further assistance from taxpayers.”160 Other documents revealed that 
Freddie Mac was “‘expected to be net income positive by the end of 2012 and 
Fannie [Mae] by the end of 2013.’”161 The GSEs got to this point of fiscal sobriety 
through policies that trampled the rights and interests of homeowners.
B.  Sale of Non-Performing Loans
In February 2012, FHFA announced a program exploring new approaches to the
disposition of foreclosed properties (“real estate owned” or “REO”) in Fannie 
Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s inventory.162
The REO Initiative allows qualified investors to purchase pools of
foreclosed properties with the requirement to rent the purchased
properties for a specified number of years. This rental period could
provide relief for local housing markets that continue to be depressed by
the volume of foreclosed properties, and provide additional rental options
to certain markets. Pre-qualification ensures investors will have the 
financial capacity and operational expertise to manage properties in a
way that is conducive to the stabilization of communities hard hit by the
housing downturn.163
By 2016, FHFA had sold thousands of nonperforming loans with a total unpaid 
principal balance of $14 billion.164 Most of these sales were made to large investors, 
like the Blackstone Group, American Homes 4 Rent, and American Residential 
                                                          
their Treasury debt remains the same. Id. But, there have been no new draws since the fourth 
quarter of 2012. Id.
159 Id. (quoting Susan McFarland, former Fannie Mae CFO). “McFarland said that Fannie 
could soon reap about $50 billion in income because of the reversal of an accounting entry, 
known as a deferred tax asset, required under accounting rules when the company began earning 
profits again.” Id.
160 Id.
161 Id. (quoting a Memo to Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner from Mary John Miller, 
assistant secretary for financial markets).
162 Real Estate Owned (REO), FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY,
https://www.fhfa.gov/PolicyProgramsResearch/Policy/Pages/Real-Estate-Owned-(REO).aspx 
(last visited Feb. 20, 2018).
163 Id. The program was adopted by the FHFA in conjunction with Treasury and HUD. 
FHFA Announces Interested Investors May Pre-Qualify for REO Initiative, FED. HOUS. FIN.
AGENCY (Feb. 1, 2012), https://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/FHFA-Announces-
Interested-Investors-May-PreQualify-for-REO-Initiative.aspx.
164 FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, 2016 REPORT TO CONGRESS (2017), 
https://www.fhfa.gov/AboutUs/Reports/ReportDocuments/FHFA_2016_Report-to-
Congress.pdf.
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Properties.165 Needless to say, the investors were not motivated to further the national 
policy toward homeownership by returning homes to their former owners.166
C. Limits on Transfers of Fannie Mae- and Freddie Mac-Mortgaged Properties
There were additional onerous self-preservation measures and policies 
implemented that have since been abandoned.167 These policies are the “Arm’s 
Length” and “Make-Whole” policies.
1.  Arm’s Length Requirements for Short Sales
Under the Arm’s Length Policy,168 the GSEs issued guidance documents, 
described as anti-fraud provisions, to mortgage servicers:
A servicer must not approve a borrower for a short sale if there is evidence 
of fraud or misrepresentation in the transaction. The borrower, purchaser, 
and all parties involved in the transaction must sign and date a Short Sale 
Affidavit (Form 191) at the time of the closing confirming that the 
transaction is an arm’s-length transaction with all proceeds (net of 
allowable transaction costs as described above) applied to the mortgage 
loan payoff in full satisfaction of the entire first-lien mortgage debt. An 
arm’s-length transaction is a transaction between parties who are unrelated 
and unaffiliated by family, marriage, or commercial enterprise. The 
servicer may allow the borrower, purchaser, and all parties involved to sign 
individually on separate copies of the short sale affidavit. In addition, the 
servicer must retain the original signed short sale affidavit(s) in the 
mortgage loan servicing file.169
By its terms, this policy makes a short sale, which is the sale of a property in default 
whose proceeds are used to satisfy the debt, more difficult by prohibiting a related 
party—meaning a family member—from buying the distressed property.170
Perversely, an unrelated third-party could purchase the property in a short sale and sell 
or rent it as she pleased, meaning she could allow the foreclosed owner to rent or buy 
back the property.171 However, a family member could not.172 The policy was also 
                                                          
165 Matthew Goldstein, Investors Who Bought Foreclosed Homes in Bulk Look to Sell, N.Y.
TIMES, June 28, 2014, at B1.
166 See infra text accompanying note 173.
167 Press Release, Attorney Gen. of Mass., AG Coakley Sues Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
over Their Refusal to Engage in Foreclosure Buyback Programs (June 2, 2014) [hereinafter 
Press Release, Attorney Gen. of Mass.].
168 FANNIE MAE, SERVICING GUIDE ANNOUNCEMENT SVC-2012-19, 1 (2012) [hereinafter 
FANNIE MAE, SERVICING GUIDE ANNOUNCEMENT] (discussing the policy changes made to 
implement the FHFA’s July 3, 2012 Directive).
169 Id. at 13; see FREDDIE MAC, BULLETIN NO. 2012-16, 2 (Aug. 21, 2012).
170 FANNIE MAE, SERVICING GUIDE ANNOUNCEMENT, supra note 168.
171 Id.
172 Id.
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applied to prevent purchase by a non-profit entity for the purpose of resale to the 
former owner.173
2. Make-Whole Provisions After Foreclosure
The GSEs’ Make-Whole policy “required homeowners who had been through 
foreclosure and wanted to buy their homes back to pay the entire amount owed on the 
mortgage.”174 But a homeowner who is unable to save the property through the 
exercise of the equitable right of redemption, which exists in all states, is unlikely to 
be able to pay the entire balance owed after foreclosure. I discuss how pernicious this 
policy is below.175
D. Partial Pull Back by GSEs
On November 25, 2014, the FHFA “directed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac . . . to 
alter one of their policies relating to the sale of (REO) properties in their current 
inventory.”176 This alteration permitted the GSEs to sell their existing “properties to 
any qualified purchaser at the property’s fair-market value, as determined by the 
[GSEs].”177 The FHFA then extended this requirement “to anyone buying the home 
for the benefit of the previous homeowner.”178 Under the new policy change, former 
homeowners—or a third-party on the homeowner’s behalf—can repurchase the home 
under the fair-market value policy that applies to all other purchasers of REO 
properties.179 However, the policy change was expressly limited to Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac REO inventory of single-family homes as of November 25, 2014,180
thereby leaving thousands of homeowners who had lost their homes to foreclosure 
without a right to recover them.181
IV. THE CHALLENGES
The financial losses from the crisis coupled with the GSEs’ post-crisis responses 
were breathtaking. Some of the challenges to the GSEs’ policies in state courts, which 
asserted violations of state laws aimed to preserve homeownership, often faced 
counterarguments asserting federal preemption.182 In this section of the Article, I 
suggest that trying to require the GSEs to abide by state law was not the only strategy 
                                                          
173 Discussed infra in Massachusetts v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 54 F. Supp. 3d 94 (D. Mass. 
2014), and Suero v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 123 F. Supp. 3d 162 (D. Mass. 2015).
174 FHFA Directs Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to Change Requirement Relating to Sales 
of Existing REO, FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY (Nov. 25, 2014) [hereinafter FHFA Directs Fannie 
Mae], https://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/pages/fhfa-directs-fannie-mae-and-freddie-
mac-to-change-requirements-relating-to-sales-of-existing-reo.aspx.
175 See infra text accompanying notes 300–10.
176 FHFA Directs Fannie Mae, supra note 174.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 See Massachusetts v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 54 F. Supp. 3d 94 (D. Mass. 2014).
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available. Instead, a better course might be to force compliance with co-equal federal 
laws—those aimed at equal treatment in the receipt of federal benefits and in access 
and retention of housing. In the latter scenario, the only apparent theoretical barrier 
might be statutory preclusion, but this is established by a wholly different set of 
considerations.
A.  Preemption Under the Supremacy Clause
The failed legal challenges to the GSEs’ policies were predicated upon state and 
local laws, which are subordinate to federal law in our national scheme of government, 
and were met with the successful assertion of the preemption doctrine:183 in Chicago, 
an ordinance required the registration and maintenance of vacant buildings by all 
mortgagees, including Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,184 and in Massachusetts, an act 
limited foreclosures and required mitigation measures.185 However, in Washington, 
the court upheld a challenge to the GSEs’ policy of taking possession of homes in 
default by entering and changing locks prior to foreclosure.186
The Supremacy Clause provides that the laws and treaties of the United States 
“shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of 
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”187 The long-settled interpretation of this 
clause is that state laws in conflict with federal law are “without effect.”188 Even in the 
absence of an express preemption, federal law may impliedly preempt state law 
“where it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal 
requirements . . . .”189 When state law requires an action that federal law forbids, the 
state law is without effect.190
Preemption traditionally falls into three categories: express preemption, field 
preemption, and conflict preemption.191 “Express preemption occurs when Congress 
enacts a statute that expressly commands that state law on the particular subject is 
                                                          
183 Id.
184 CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 13-12-125(a)(1) (2018).
185 Act Preventing Unlawful and Unnecessary Foreclosures, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, §§ 
14, 35B–35C (2018).
186 Jordan v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 240 F. Supp. 3d 1114, 1117 (E.D. Wash. 2017).
187 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
188 Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 
427 (1819); see Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992) (“[U]nder 
the Supremacy Clause, from which our pre-emption doctrine is derived, “‘any state law, 
however clearly within a State’s acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to 
federal law, must yield.’”” (quoting Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988) (quoting Free v. 
Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962)).
189 English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990); see Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, 
Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963) (“A holding of federal exclusion of state law is 
inescapable and requires no inquiry into congressional design where compliance with both 
federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility for one engaged in interstate commerce 
. . . .”).
190 Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472, 475 (2013).
191 Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1594–95 (2015).
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displaced.”192 Field preemption occurs if Congress “intended ‘to foreclose any state 
regulation in the area,’ irrespective of whether state law is consistent or inconsistent 
with ‘federal standards.’ In such situations, Congress has forbidden the State to take 
action in the field that the federal statute pre-empts.”193 Finally, “conflict pre-emption 
exists where ‘compliance with both state and federal law is impossible,’ or where ‘the 
state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress.’”194 Moreover, preemption can occur through 
federal regulations in addition to statutes.195
Yet, “[u]nder our system of dual sovereignty, courts deciding whether a particular 
state law is preempted under the Supremacy Clause must strive to maintain the 
‘delicate balance’ between the States and the Federal Government, . . . especially when 
Congress is regulating in an area ‘traditionally occupied by the States.’”196 “[C]ourts 
applying the Supremacy Clause are to begin with a presumption against 
preemption.”197 Courts also apply “‘a plain statement rule,’ holding that a federal 
statute preempts a state law only when it is the ‘clear and manifest’ purpose of 
Congress to do so. Only where the state and federal laws cannot be reconciled do 
courts hold that Congress’s enactments must prevail.”198 To determine whether there 
is a conflict, the Court discerns what duties are required by state law.199 Then, it 
considers what liabilities are imposed for failing to fulfill those duties.200 If complying 
with those state law duties in a way that does not run afoul of a federal pronouncement 
is not possible, then the federal law preempts the state law.201
B.  Local Regulation of GSEs in Their Ownership of Mortgages
An effort to cause the enterprises to engage in specific practices for the benefit of 
borrowers, but not to avoid losses, as is the current tenor of GSE policy, will run up 
against the preemption doctrine. The first case to attempt to reconcile such issues is 
Federal Housing Financing Agency v. City of Chicago.202 In that case, the City of 
Chicago adopted an ordinance that required the registration and maintenance of vacant 
                                                          
192 Gadda v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 934, 944 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 
1126, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003)).
193 Oneok, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 1595 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Arizona v. United States, 
567 U.S. 387, 401 (2012)).
194 Id. (quoting California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100, 101 (1989)).
195 See, e.g., Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344, 351–59 (2000) (finding the 
Federal Railroad Safety Act preempted certain state tort claims through regulations 
implemented under the Act).
196 Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383, 392 (9th Cir. 2012) (first quoting Gregory v. 
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991); then quoting United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 
(2000)).
197 Id.
198 Id. (quoting Gregory, 501 U.S. at 461).
199 Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472, 480 (2013).
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. City of Chicago, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1044 (N.D. Ill. 2013).
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buildings by all mortgagees, including those held by the GSEs.203 FHFA challenged 
the application of the ordinance to it, relying on HERA.204 The district court agreed 
that HERA had no express preemption because the language asserting supremacy 
referred specifically to other agencies of the federal government or any state, but did 
not contain a limitation on actions by local governments.205 The court pointed out that 
although express preemption requires Congress to declare its intentions to preempt 
through a direct statement,206 “HERA’s lack of reference to local governments in its 
preemption clause” only meant that “the statutory language alone [was] insufficient to 
demonstrate a clear and manifest purpose to preempt the [o]rdinance.”207
The court went on to consider whether the local regulation was precluded by field 
preemption. It noted that “Congress enacted an extensive federal statutory scheme 
which specifically requires the Director of FHFA to ‘establish risk-based capital 
requirements for [Fannie and Freddie] to ensure that [they] operate in a safe and sound 
manner, maintaining sufficient capital and reserves to support the risks that arise in 
the operations and management of [Fannie and Freddie].’”208 “[T]he [o]rdinance 
encroach[ed] on an area of regulation that Congress reserved exclusively for FHFA,” 
giving FHFA the authority to manage its collateral.209 This authority included control 
specifically over “how this collateral—which FHFA [did] not actually own—should 
be preserved.”210 The court found that “[o]nce placed in conservatorship, Congress 
intended for FHFA to be the sole entity responsible for operating Fannie and Freddie’s
nationwide business of purchasing and securitizing mortgages.”211 The City of 
Chicago claimed that HERA simultaneously intended to preempt state governments 
while also leaving local governments to regulate FHFA.212 The court rejected this 
claim because it was untenable and would create chaos, as “FHFA would be subject 
to a variety of potentially conflicting ordinances, raising the expenses of the FHFA in 
not only complying with those ordinances, but in simply monitoring the various 
requirements.”213 There was also conflict preemption to an extent:
                                                          
203 Id. at 1047–48.
204 Id. at 1048.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 1056.
207 Id. at 1057.
208 Id. at 1059 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 4611(a) (2013)).
209 Id. at 1059.
210 Id. Specifically, “when FHFA issues guidelines and instructions to servicers regarding 
the nature and frequency of inspections of vacant and abandoned properties, it is taking those 
steps it believes necessary to preserve and conserve Fannie and Freddie’s assets and property.” 
Id.
211 Id. at 1059–60 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 4617(a)(7) (2013)).
212 Id. at 1058.
213 Id. at 1060. The court cautioned that “[t]his is not to say that FHFA can let properties 
where it is the mortgagee become decrepit.” Id. Instead, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s “own 
guidelines . . . require it to maintain the properties in a manner to preserve their value.” Id.
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the [o]rdinance obstructs Congress’s intent to have one conservator take 
control of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and take action as may be 
“appropriate to carry on [their business] and preserve and conserve [their] 
assets and property” without being “subject to the direction or supervision 
of any other agency of the United States or any [s]tate . . . .”214
In the end, the court found “the overall goal of HERA was to preserve the assets of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,”215 and the local ordinance that tended to restrict that 
ability must be preempted.216
C.  Anti-Injunction Under HERA
In 2012, the Massachusetts legislature passed “An Act Preventing Unlawful and 
Unnecessary Foreclosures” (the “Foreclosure Law”).217 The Foreclosure Law aimed 
both to offer relief to homeowners burdened by the riskiest subprime mortgages and 
to curb abusive foreclosure practices as they pertained to new mortgage loans.218 For 
existing homeowners, the law required a mortgagee-creditor to extend a loan 
modification offer to a borrower in circumstances where it would lead to more 
affordable payments and cost less than the expenses of foreclosure.219 The Foreclosure 
Law also regulated the foreclosure process.220
                                                          
214 Id. at 1061 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(2)(D)(ii) (2013)). 
The Court [also found] that the registration fee required by the Ordinance [was] an 
impermissible tax on the federal government, because the revenue from the registration 
fee “[did] not go to pay for some service that [the City] renders to [FHFA], or . . . to 
some service that is required by the existence of [FHFA].”
Id. at 1063 (some alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Empress Casino Joliet Corp. 
v. Balmoral Racing Club, Inc., 651 F.3d 722, 733 (7th Cir. 2011)). 
The City’s monitoring of vacant properties is not a service the City “renders to” FHFA, 
but is an action the City undertakes to benefit City residents in general. Further, FHFA’s 
“existence” does not cause properties to be vacant, and vacant properties are not a 
necessary aspect of FHFA’s participation in the mortgage market.
Id.
215 Id. at 1060.
216 Id. at 1061.
217 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, §§ 14, 35B–35C (2018); Compliance with Chapter 194 of the 
Acts of 2012, an Act Preventing Unlawful and Unnecessary Foreclosures, MASS.GOV (Oct. 3, 
2012), https://www.mass.gov/advisory/compliance-with-chapter-194-of-the-acts-of-2012-an-
act-preventing-unlawful-and-unnecessary.
218 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 14 (2018).
219 Id. § 35B.
220 Among other things, the law imposes stringent notice requirements, prohibits the 
initiation of a foreclosure by a party without the actual authority to do so, forbids a creditor from 
shifting the costs of correcting title defects to third-parties or imposing non-foreclosure related 
fees on borrowers, and punishes a creditor for making false statements in a court of law about 
its compliance with these requirements or about the borrower’s payment history. Id. §§ 14, 35C.
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When a violation of the Foreclosure Law occurs, injunction ordinarily is the 
method of enforcement.221 But, when the FHFA is the foreclosing entity, this remedy 
is unavailable because of the anti-injunctions provision in HERA: “no court may take 
any action to restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of the [FHFA] as a 
conservator” of the GSEs.222
Two cases before the district court in Massachusetts ruled that enforcement of the 
Foreclosure Law must give way to the anti-injunction provisions of HERA. In the first, 
Massachusetts v. Federal Housing Financing Agency,223 the court ruled that the anti-
injunction provision deprived the court of jurisdiction to rule on a challenge to Freddie 
Mac’s Arm’s Length and Make-Whole restrictions.224 The challenge asserted that the 
restrictions under the state law conflicted with what the Arm’s Length and Make-
Whole provisions allowed.225 The restrictions provided:
no creditor shall require as a condition of sale or transfer to any [non-profit] 
entity any affidavit, statement, agreement or addendum limiting ownership 
or occupancy of the residential property by the borrower and, if obtained, 
such affidavit, statement, agreement or addendum shall not provide a basis 
to avoid a sale or transfer . . . .226
The district court concluded that, in directing the GSEs to implement and enforce the 
Arm’s Length and Make-Whole restrictions, the FHFA acted within the scope of its 
powers and duties as conservator under HERA.227 The FHFA reasoned that the GSEs 
would suffer losses without the Arm’s Length and Make-Whole restrictions if 
                                                          
221 WILLIAM V. HOVEY ET AL., 28 MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE SERIES 3 (4th ed. 2004 & Supp. 
2009–2010).
222 12 U.S.C. § 4617(f) (2018). 
223 Massachusetts v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 54 F. Supp. 3d 94, 101–02 (D. Mass. 2014).
224 Id. Is asking whether unwritten directives are “federal laws” protected by Preemption 
Doctrine a fair question? The only way to answer this question is to back into it, starting with 
some settled propositions. In Christensen v. Harris County, the Supreme Court confronted “an 
interpretation contained in an opinion letter, not one arrived at after, for example, a formal 
adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking.” Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 
(2000). The Court stated that “[i]nterpretations such as those in opinion letters—like 
interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all 
of which lack the force of law—do not warrant Chevron-style deference.” Id. From this 
proposition, can one conclude that such policies are not the law of the land entitled to deference 
under the Supremacy Clause? The State of Massachusetts declined to take this approach, but 
FHFA asserted its mere existence as a federal agency meant that any policy they adopted 
preempted any state law that interfered.
225 Id. at 95–96.
226 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 35C(h) (2018). In 2009, the Boston Community Capital 
(“BCC”) established the Stabilizing Urban Neighborhoods Initiative (the “SUN Initiative”) to 
remediate inner-city neighborhoods plagued by “underwater” mortgages and abandoned homes 
through the purchase of troubled mortgages or post-foreclosure homes at their current fair 
market value then reselling or renting the properties to the former homeowners at their 
reassessed (lower) value. BCC claimed to have saved homeownership for 475 families. 
Massachusetts, 54 F. Supp. 3d at 96.
227 Massachusetts, 54 F. Supp. 3d at 101.
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distressed homeowners opted to submit to an “otherwise avoidable foreclosure on a 
mortgage in anticipation of later repurchasing the home at a lower price from the non-
profit intermediary entity.”228 The court characterized the decision to reject the terms 
of the state buy-back law as a matter of “business judgment intended to ‘preserve and 
conserve [the GSEs’] assets and property’”; therefore, the court was precluded from 
looking into the matter.229 The court also concluded that even if HERA did not 
preclude the suit, the preemption doctrine would bar it because the situation presented 
an “irreconcilable conflict” between the federal and state laws.230
The second case, Suero v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, had 
virtually identical facts and was brought by an individual former homeowner.231
Because Massachusetts was pending, the court in Suero held the case under 
advisement until the resolution of the other case.232 When the appellate court dismissed 
the appeal of the ruling in Massachusetts, the court in Suero found the anti-injunction 
provisions of HERA precluded the action to enjoin Freddie Mac to sell a foreclosed 
property to a non-profit entity pursuant to the state Foreclosure Law.233 The court also 
found that HERA preempted the state law.234 Apparently acknowledging the 
insuperable bars to an action, the homeowner could only offer challenges based on 
seemingly unimportant distinctions235 and the court rejected all of them.236 In 
particular, the court rejected the claim that Freddie Mac’s refusal was a policy 
promulgated by Freddie Mac and therefore was not an act by FHFA as a conservator 
because FHFA had adopted Freddie Mac’s policy and program.237 FHFA was also 
acting as a conservator because it promoted Freddie Mac’s policy and retained capital 
with their business activities.238 FHFA endorsed the policy as a means of protecting 
the GSEs against fraud and preventing distressed homeowners from strategically 
defaulting with plans to repurchase their homes at a lower price from the non-profit 
intermediary entity.239 Measures and policies toward this end constituted acting as a 
conservator for purposes of the anti-injunction provision.240 The court determined that 
FHFA acts as conservator when “it evaluates the risk of certain business transactions 
                                                          
228 Id.
229 Id. (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(2)(D)(ii) (2014) (noting that this law expressly removed 
conservatorship decisions form judicial oversight)).
230 Id. at 101 n.8.
231 Suero v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 123 F. Supp. 3d 162 (D. Mass. 2015).
232 Id. at 165.
233 Id.
234 Id. at 165 n.2.
235 Id. at 173–74.
236 Id.
237 Id. at 174.
238 Id.
239 Id. at 172.
240 Id. at 172–73.
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and takes prudential action to avoid those that it deems undesirable.”241 This was also 
the case with the Arm’s Length and Make-Whole policies.242 The court stated that 
while “‘FHFA’s powers as conservator are not limitless,” FHLMC and Fannie Mae 
had “demonstrated how FHFA’s adoption of the [Arm’s Length] and Make-Whole 
policies furthers its statutory mission as a protective conservator. That is enough to 
preclude judicial intervention.”243
D. Unlimited Powers to Contravene State Law Rejected
In Jordan v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC,244 the FHFA intervened in a suit that 
challenged a policy by the GSEs’ loan servicers.245 The policy permitted the loan 
servicers to take possession of foreclosed homes by entering and changing locks prior 
to foreclosure.246 This practice violated state law.247 In a close textual and policy 
analysis of HERA, the district court rejected FHFA’s assertion of preemption.248 The 
court took the language adopting HERA to heart, believing that “Congress enacted 
HERA not only to prevent . . . [further] ‘irresponsible behavior’ [of the GSEs,] but 
also to aid homeowners by ‘mak[ing] the American dream of homeownership for all 
a reality instead of a nightmare.’”249 The court found nothing in the legislation that 
suggested Congress saw the “need to protect the [GSEs’] pre-foreclosure assets, 
displace state foreclosure law, or to sanctify pre-foreclosure lender possession.”250
Instead, the court determined that the opposite was true; the purpose of the legislation 
was to rescue homeowners from the brink of foreclosure.251 No express preemption of 
the particular law or type of law was at issue. Instead, the text of the legislation as a 
whole revealed that whenever Congress intended to preempt, it did so expressly,252
and the state law here did not purport to intrude on any of the areas expressly off limits 
to states.253 The court pointed out that although FHFA’s powers are broad, the 
authority conferred is not “infinite, conservator authority,” but “extends only so far as 
                                                          
241 Id. at 172 (quoting Massachusetts v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 54 F. Supp. 3d at 99, 100 
(D. Mass 2014).
242 Id. at 172 n.3.
243 Id. at 174 (quoting City of Sonoma v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 710 F.3d 987, 993 (9th 
Cir. 2013)).
244 Jordan v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 240 F. Supp. 3d 1114 (E.D. Wash. 2017).
245 Id. at 1117.
246 Jordan v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, No. 2:14–CV–0175–TOR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
65426, 2017 WL 1550238, at *1 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 28, 2017) (denying request for certification 
of interlocutory appeal).
247 WASH. REV. CODE § 7.28.230 (2018). 
248 Jordan, 240 F. Supp. 3d at 1126–27.
249 Id. at 1119 (quoting 154 CONG. REC. E1142-02 (June 4, 2008)).
250 Id.
251 Id.
252 Id. at 1121–22.
253 Id. at 1123.
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HERA’s text, purpose, and regulatory scheme allow.”254 Preemption cannot be 
inferred merely because the scheme is comprehensive.255 Indeed, the GSEs already 
recognized the force of state and local laws and had instructed their servicers to 
comply with them.256 In this vein, the court rejected conflict preemption because 
compliance with state foreclosure laws would not thwart FHFA’s charge to conserve 
assets, but would only safeguard a homeowner’s property from entry prior to 
foreclosure and sale.257 In the end, the court stated that HERA does not confer a right 
to FHFA that the state law takes away, nor does HERA authorize FHFA to repudiate 
statutory property interest protections.258
While the result of Jordan may be encouraging, the other two cases remain as 
obstacles to the GSEs’ practices as they are lodged in the courts on similar grounds.259
Let us turn to other theories for challenge.
V. PROMISING AVENUES FOR CHALLENGING GSES: SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND 
STATUTORY PRECLUSION NOTWITHSTANDING
Under the above-mentioned principles, a federal agency is endowed with a degree 
of freedom to maneuver without interference and intrusion by state and local 
governments.260 Constitutional provisions govern agencies and serve as a check on due 
process and equal protection infractions.261 Sovereign immunity will not bar a suit 
based on alleged unconstitutional or otherwise unlawful conduct by federal officials.262
                                                          
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 Id. at 1124.
257 Id. at 1127.
258 Id. at 1128.
259 Compare the complaint on maintenance obligations filed in Quintero v. Wells Fargo 
Bank, N.A., a class action suit filed in federal court in San Francisco. Quintero v. Wells Fargo 
Bank, N.A., No. C–13–04937 JSC, 2014 WL 202755, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6807, at *10–11
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2014) (rejecting conflict presumption by the Homeowners Loan Act of 
California that required notice and contact with a borrower before initiating default remedies 
because the state statute did not pertain to terms of credit, interest, or payments as covered by 
the Federal Act).
260 Principles for State-Federal Relations, NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N,
https://www.nga.org/cms/policy-positions/executive-committee/principles-for-state-federal-
relations (last visited Jan. 28, 2018).
261 U.S. CONST. art. IV, cl. 2.
262 Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963); see Powelton Civic Home Owners Ass’n v. 
Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 284 F. Supp. 809, 834 (E.D. Pa. 1968); cf. Bolling v. Sharpe, 
347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954); Shannon v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809, 815–
16 (3d Cir. 1970); Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619, 623 (E.D. La. 1969).
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A.  Due Process and Equal Protection
1. A History of Discriminatory Practices
Constitutional claims have been successful against federal housing agencies.263
This assessment does not account for the early insidious history of the Federal Housing 
Administration. Despite what began as a lofty, honorable mission—to facilitate 
homeownership—in its early years, the Federal Housing Administration engaged in 
intentional racial discrimination.264 At first, while the GSEs worked alongside the 
federal tax programs to make housing affordable by providing mortgage insurance,265
capping interest rates, prescribing uniform lending criteria, lowering down-payments, 
and expanding mortgage terms,266 the Federal Housing Administration and Veterans 
Administration mortgage insurance program guidelines contained other eligibility 
requirements that operated as barriers to homeownership for certain persons.267
Among these requirements were minimum lot sizes, low-density settings, stringent 
construction standards, and limitations of qualifying homes to individual units.268 All 
of such properties were more likely found in suburban areas that were largely 
populated by whites and as such, these standards operated to exclude racial minorities 
from the benefits of Federal Housing Administration programs;269 a large percentage 
of minority home buyers did not live in areas that satisfied the above-mentioned 
criteria,270 but instead resided in the densely-populated inner cities.271 In addition, 
when determining the amount and availability of mortgage insurance, the Federal 
Housing Administration partially based its appraisals on neighborhood quality, giving 
lower appraisals to homes in neighborhoods that had predominantly African-
American residents.272 The valuation standards did not consider the need for 
                                                          
263 Interview by Terry Gross with Richard Rothstein, Author, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley Sch. 
of Law (May 3, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/05/03/526655831/a-forgotten-history-of-
how-the-u-s-government-segregated-america.
264 Terry Gross, A ‘Forgotten History’ of How the U.S. Government Segregated America,
NPR (May 3, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/05/03/526655831/a-forgotten-history-of-how-
the-u-s-government-segregated-america.
265 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701–50(g) (1994).
266 See Green, The Search, supra note 55, at 86 n.103 (“The availability of below market 
interest rates for mortgages under the Homeownership Assistance Program enabled more 
minorities to purchase homes. However, in many respects, the program proved a failure for 
minorities. In particular, default and foreclosure rates reached higher than 18% in 1979. It 
appears that realtors, acting to exploit racial attitudes, were able to acquire properties from 
whites at artificially low prices and sold them to blacks at inflated values. Laxity in enforcement 
of standards resulted in loan balances higher than the value of the homes.”).
267 Id. at 86.
268 Id.
269 Id. at 86 n.104 (citing Michael H. Schill & Susan M. Wachter, The Spatial Bias of 
Federal Housing Law and Policy: Concentrated Poverty in Urban America, 143 U. PA. L. REV.
1285, 1309 (1995)).
270 Id. at 91–92.
271 Id.
272 Id. at 86; see Schill & Wachter, supra note 269, at 1309–10.
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customized work, a greater number of skilled workers, higher levels of supervision, 
and control for inner city properties.273 The Federal Housing Administration also 
overtly maintained policies that were aimed at perpetuating segregated 
neighborhoods.274 For example, it recommended that municipalities enact racially 
restrictive zoning ordinances and restrictive covenants that prohibited African-
Americans from owning homes in certain areas.275
Although FHA ultimately abandoned these practices, other overt forms of 
discrimination by government agencies continued.276 Early on, the discriminatory 
practices were challenged under the Fifth Amendment, which guarantees citizens 
equal protection of the law and due process of law.277 Courts interpret these provisions 
to prohibit discrimination by the government on the basis of race, religion, national 
origin, and other such characteristics.278 The notion that a federal agency could be held 
liable for due process and equal protection violations was not fairly tested in the 
housing context until Gautreaux v. Romney.279 In that case, the Seventh Circuit ruled that 
HUD’s acquiescence to the Chicago Housing Authority’s (“CHA”) admittedly 
discriminatory housing program violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment and Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.280 HUD violated these 
laws by approving and funding segregated CHA housing sites.281 Neither the district 
court nor the Seventh Circuit was persuaded by HUD’s argument that its approval 
should be excused as an attempted accommodation of an admittedly urgent need for 
housing.282 The facts undeniably showed that while the sites for the projects that had 
                                                          
273 Green, The Search, supra note 55, at 86 n.108; see JOSEPH L. STEVENS, IMPACT OF 
FEDERAL LEGISLATION AND PROGRAMS ON PRIVATE LAND IN URBAN AND METROPOLITAN 
DEVELOPMENT 10–11 (1973) (noting mortgage capital for home improvement was largely 
unavailable and discussing FHA restrictions).
274 Green, The Search, supra note 55, at 86 n.106 (“‘The FHA underwriting manual warned 
against making loans in areas with ‘inharmonious racial groups’ and instructed lenders that if a 
neighborhood is to retain stability, it is necessary that properties shall continue to be occupied 
by the same social and racial classes.’” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Schill & 
Wachter, supra note 269, at 1310)); see Florence Wagman Roisman, Intentional Racial 
Discrimination and Segregation by the Federal Government as a Principal Cause of 
Concentrated Poverty: A Response to Schill & Wachter, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1351, 1355–56
(1995) (examining the interplay of housing policies and the poor).
275 See Schill & Wachter, supra note 269, at 1310.
276 Natasha M. Trifun, Residential Segregation After the Fair Housing Act, 36 HUM. RTS.
14, 14 (2009).
277 Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731, 737–38 (7th Cir. 1971).
278 Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 
2525–26 (2015).
279 Gautreaux, 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971). 
280 42 U.S.C. §2000d (2012) (“No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, 
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance.”).
281 Gautreaux, 448 F.2d at 737.
282 Id.
34https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol66/iss3/5
2018] TESTING FANNIE MAE’S 511
been constructed were “chosen primarily to further the praiseworthy and urgent goals 
of low-cost housing and urban renewal,” there was a deliberate policy to separate the 
races.283 HUD could not justify this policy by its good intentions with which it pursued 
other laudable goals.284 Instead, HUD’s alleged good faith was “no more of a defense
to segregation in public housing than it [was] to segregation in public schools.”285 The 
Supreme Court eloquently expressed this near-universal sentiment on this point in 
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority:286 “[i]t is of no consolation to an individual 
denied the equal protection of the laws that it was done in good faith.”287 Nor do 
otherwise honorable efforts toward desegregation preclude liability for an otherwise 
segregated result.288
The fact that the actor was a federal agency or officer made no difference, as the 
Constitution does not impose a lesser duty on the federal government.289 HUD played 
an integral role in the construction of the public housing system in Chicago, as it 
provided the bulk of funding for home construction.290 Between 1950 and 1966, HUD 
funded nearly $350 million worth of housing construction costs and exercised a large 
amount of discretion over both site selection and the tenant assignment procedures in 
the housing system.291 “[T]he [HUD] Secretary exercised the above-described powers 
in a manner which perpetuated a racially discriminatory housing system in Chicago, 
and . . . the Secretary and other HUD officials were aware of that fact.”292 The 
                                                          
283 Id. at 738.
284 Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907, 914 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
285 Gautreaux, 448 F.2d at 738 (citing Gautreaux, 296 F. Supp. at 907); Kennedy Park 
Homes Ass’n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970).
286 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961).
287 Id.
288 Id. Thus, for example, in Cooper v. Aaron, the local school board admittedly was “going 
forward with its preparation for desegregating the Little Rock[, Arkansas] school system,” but 
was still held liable when it abandoned those plans in the face of stiff community and state 
governmental resistance. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 8 (1958); see Watson v. City of 
Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 535 (1963); Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127, 1136 (D.D.C. 
1970).
289 Gautreaux, 448 F.2d at 738 (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500, (1954)); see
Green, 309 F. Supp. at 1136.
290 Gautreaux, 448 F.2d at 732.
291 Id. at 739. “HUD’s ‘Annual Contributions Contract’ contained detailed provisions 
concerning program operations” and included “eight pages of regulations on the subject of site 
selection alone.” Id.
292 Id.
The fact that HUD knew of such circumstances is borne out by the District Court’s 
specific finding in this suit that HUD tried to block “the activity complained of, 
succeeded in some respects, but continued funding knowing of the possible action the 
City Council would take.” This finding [was] supported by, among other record items, 
the HUD letter to the West Side Federation . . . and by the affidavit of HUD official 
Bergeron recalling his unsuccessful attempts in the early 1950s “to enlist [Mayor 
Kennelly’s] assistance in having project sites located in white neighborhoods.”
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Secretary’s past actions constituted racially discriminatory conduct in their own right, 
and the fact that the Secretary’s exercise of his powers may have more often reflected 
CHA’s own racially discriminatory choices than it did any ill will on HUD’s part did 
not alter this finding.
Even while fully sympathetic to the arguments advanced by the Secretary on 
appeal, the court concluded that the great weight of case law favored the plaintiffs’ 
position; HUD violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment as well as 
Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.293
Two other decisions buttressed the court’s ruling. First, in Hicks v. Weaver,294 the 
court reasoned:
HUD was not only aware of the situation in Bogalusa[, Louisiana] but it 
effectively directed and controlled each and every step in the program. . . . 
HUD thus sanctioned the violation of plaintiffs’ rights and was an active 
participant since it could have halted the discrimination at any step in the 
program. Consequently, its own discriminatory conduct in this respect is 
violative of 42 U.S.C. [§] 2000d.295
Likewise, in Shannon v. United States Department of Housing and Urban 
Development,296 the Third Circuit stopped HUD from changing the structure of a 
proposed housing project in Philadelphia from an owner-occupied complex to a 100% 
rent supplement assistance program that was the “functional equivalent of a low rent 
public housing project.”297 The Shannon court acknowledged that Congress vested 
HUD with broad discretion to supervise its various programs, but held “that discretion 
must be exercised within the framework of the national policy against discrimination 
in federally assisted housing . . . and in favor of fair housing.”298
2. GSEs Are State Actors Whose Policies Offend Due Process
The GSEs’ Make-Whole and Arm’s Length policies offend due process because 
they deny homeowners rights of redemption that exist under state law.299 The right to 
redeem property before foreclosure (through the equitable right of redemption) and 
after foreclosure (through statutory redemption) are inalienable property rights that 
burden a mortgage.300 All states afford a defaulting mortgagor the equitable right of 
                                                          
Id. (first quoting Gautreaux, 296 F. Supp. at 907; then quoting HUD official Bergeron’s 
affidavit).
293 Id. at 737.
294 Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. La. 1969).
295 Id. at 623.
296 Shannon v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809, 809 (3d Cir. 1970).
297 Id. at 819.
298 Id.
299 See JOHN RAO & GEOFF WALSH, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., FORECLOSING A DREAM:
STATE LAWS DEPRIVE HOMEOWNERS OF BASIC PROTECTIONS 32–35 (2009), 
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/report-foreclosing-dream.pdf.
300 See generally THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 101.07 (David A. Thomas ed., 2d ed. 
1998); U.S. FORECLOSURE NETWORK, NATIONAL MORTGAGE SERVICER’S REFERENCE 
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redemption, and more than half of states provide a statutory right to redeem foreclosed 
property after the foreclosure sale for a specified period.301 In most jurisdictions, the 
homeowner has the right to possess the property during the redemption period and 
may redeem at the amount paid for the property at the foreclosure sale.302 The GSEs’ 
policies deny, or at a minimum frustrate, these rights in a way that denies the 
mortgagor due process and equal protection.
The only possible obstacle to due process and equal protection challenges to the 
GSEs’ policies is the requirement of state action. Fannie Mae unquestionably was a 
government agency at the time Congress created it; but, in 1968, Fannie Mae’s 
organizational character changed when Congress chartered it as a government-
sponsored private corporation.303 Even as a private corporation, Fannie Mae’s federal 
charter gave it special privileges not enjoyed by corporations chartered under state 
law.304 In particular, Fannie Mae was exempted from taxation and, because it was 
created to purchase and deal in FHA-insured mortgages, it carried an implicit 
government guarantee.305 Nevertheless, its formal status as a private corporation has 
been asserted to bar claims under the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses 
because both constitutional provisions require state action to be applicable.306
For an entity to be considered a state-actor, it must (1) be created in order to further 
governmental objectives and (2) be under the permanent control and authority of the 
government.307 These two requirements can be satisfied by looking at the FHFA’s 
powers under HERA. The imposition of the conservatorship over the GSEs was 
expressly made to stabilize the GSEs in an effort to protect housing markets as well 
as taxpayers.308 These are clearly governmental objectives. The conservatorship has 
been in place for nearly a decade, and nothing under HERA sets a time limit for the 
conservatorship or otherwise limits the powers of the FHFA over the activities of the 
GSEs.309 Because the GSEs must be regarded as state actors, they should be held liable 
for conduct that offends due process and equal protection—conduct that deprives 
                                                          
DIRECTORY ch. 10 (34th ed. 2018); Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming 
Foreclosure: The Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, 53 DUKE L.J. 1399 (2004).
301 The period of time that states permit for this right to redeem ranges from ten days to two 
years. See Nelson & Whitman, supra note 300, at 1404.
302 Id.
303 See WEISS & JONES, supra note 66, at 30; see also Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127, 
1139 (D.D.C. 1970).
304 WEISS & JONES, supra note 66, at 10.
305 See W. Scott Frame & Lawrence J. White, Charter Value, Risk-Taking Incentives, and 
Emerging Competition for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 39 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 83, 
87 (2007).
306 Nelson & Whitman, supra note 300, at 1451.
307 See Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 400 (1995).
308 WEISS & JONES, supra note 66, at 10.
309 See generally Brian Taylor Goldman, The Indefinite Conservatorship of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac Is State-Action, 17 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 11, 22 (2017).
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individuals of property rights and protections under state law. This is the same result 
reached in Gautreaux.310
Moreover, FHFA is clearly a federal agency, as it was created under HERA and 
derives its expansive powers from that legislation.311 As the district court in Jordan312
found, the FHFA succeeded to “‘all rights, titles, powers, and privileges’” of the GSEs, 
“‘plac[ing] FHFA in the shoes of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and giv[ing] the FHFA 
their rights and duties, not the other way around.’”313 Indeed, all of the GSEs’ self-
preservation policies were implemented pursuant to directives from FHFA.314 Hence, 
the presence of state action is confirmed, and the burdens on property rights under 
state law (those attending mortgaged property) and interests in the equal distribution 
of government benefits (e.g., loan forgiveness) complete the case for constitutional 
challenges.
B.  The Fair Housing Act
Agencies acting under their own governing statutes are not free to ignore the 
strictures of co-terminus statutes, such as the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”).315 Where 
other federal statutes are concerned, preemption would not be the issue.316 In this 
instance, however, the question is whether a cause of action under one federal statute 
is precluded by the provisions of another federal statute.317 In making this statutory 
preclusion determination, the Supreme Court has stated that the end is to reconcile or 
harmonize the statutes, not “to enforce both statutes in full unless there is a genuinely 
irreconcilable conflict . . . .”318 If neither statute, in express terms, forbids or limits the 
other, then other tools must be used for reconciliation.319 An express preemption of 
state law is not necessarily a preemption of a related federal law.320
In deciding whether there is statutory preclusion, courts first look at the statutory 
structures—for example, whether the two complement each other in terms of scope 
and purpose as well as remedies.321 If each statute has its own mechanism to address 
its objectives, the court considers whether precluding one statute would impair the 
                                                          
310 Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 1971).
311 Jordan v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 240 F. Supp. 3d 1114 (E.D. Wa. 2017).
312 Id. at 1122.
313 Id. at 1125 (first quoting 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(2)(A)(i) (2017); then quoting Adams v. 
Aurora Loan Servs., Inc., 813 F.3d 1259, 1261 (9th Cir. 2016)).
314 Swanson, supra note 158.
315 POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2237 (2014).
316 Id.
317 Id. at 2236 (ruling a challenge under the Lanham Act for false and deceptive labeling 
was not precluded by the FDA regulating the same conduct).
318 Id. at 2237.
319 Id.
320 Id.
321 Id. at 2238.
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ability of the other to achieve its purposes.322 Next, courts analyze whether enforcing 
one statute would defeat the other’s larger Congressional policy (such as the interests 
in centralization, forums, or resources).323 That the text of the two statutes vary in 
certain respects, such as one statute addressing its causes with more specificity than 
the other, does not matter.324
Under this analysis and the FHA’s stature, it seems highly unlikely that Congress 
intended HERA to preclude its application to the matters covered by the FHA. First, 
HERA does not have an express preclusion of other federal laws, only state laws.325
Second, HERA and the FHA complement each other to the extent that HERA can be 
read as aiming to shore up the historic role of the GSEs in serving the cause of 
housing.326 Third, and most significantly, Congress did not intend for federal agencies 
to engage in conduct that would defeat the overarching Congressional policy 
underlying the work of the GSEs, i.e., housing access as safeguarded by the FHA.327
Congress enacted the FHA in 1968 to combat and prevent segregation and 
discrimination in housing.328 The purpose of the FHA was “to provide, within 
constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States.”329 As with 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Congress passed the FHA pursuant to its power under 
the Thirteenth Amendment to eliminate the badges and incidents of slavery.330 In 
construing the former statute, the Supreme Court declared that “when racial 
discrimination herds men into ghettos and makes their ability to buy property turn on 
the color of their skin, then it too is a relic of slavery.”331
Fair housing issues arise in a host of contexts beyond the basic purchase and rental 
of housing, such as in lending;332 brokerage and insurance services;333 decisions by 
municipalities on land use, including barriers to the construction of affordable, multi-
                                                          
322 Id. at 2239 (discussing that there is lesser “policing of misleading food and beverage 
labels than in competitive markets for other products.”).
323 Id.
324 Id. at 2240.
325 See Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 
2654 (codified at scattered sections of 12, 15, 26, 37, 38, 42 U.S.C.).
326 William M. Isaac, A No-Brainer for Trump Team: Recapitalize the GSEs, AM. BANKER:
BANKTHINK (Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/a-no-brainer-for-
trump-team-recapitalize-the-gses.
327 POM Wonderful LLC, 134 S. Ct. at 2232.
328 Douglas S. Massey, The Legacy of the 1968 Fair Housing Act, 30 SOC. F. 571, 574 
(2015).
329 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2018).
330 Massey, supra note 328, at 574.
331 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 442–43 (1968).
332 See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 747 F.3d 275 
(5th Cir. 2014), aff’d, 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
333 See, e.g., Garvin v. Tran, No. C 07-1571 RS, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92704, at *4 (N.D. 
Cal. Oct. 5, 2009).
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unit housing;334 urban renewal and using eminent domain to redevelop an area;335 and 
the award of low-income housing tax credits.336
The FHA’s language prohibiting discrimination in housing is broad and inclusive; 
the purpose of its reach is to replace segregated neighborhoods with truly integrated 
and balanced living patterns.337 In commemorating the fortieth anniversary of the FHA 
and the twentieth anniversary of the FHA Amendments, the House of Representatives 
reiterated that “the intent of Congress in passing the Fair Housing Act was broad and 
inclusive, to advance equal opportunity in housing and achieve racial integration for 
the benefit of all people in the United States . . . .”338 However, until very recently, the 
Supreme Court had not yet settled the question of whether a violation of the FHA 
required a showing of intent. For equal protection violations, the Supreme Court had 
already answered the question. In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan 
Housing Development Corporation, the Court ruled that constitutional due process 
and equal protection violations require a showing of intent.339 In Gautreaux, the court 
found evidence of intentional discrimination in violation of the Constitution and a 
federal civil rights statute (but not under the FHA as most of the violations occurred 
before the enactment) by the deliberate adoption of policies setting up segregated 
communities.340
1. Disparate Impact Theory
The discriminatory effect of a governmental rule or policy arises in two contexts: 
adverse impact on members of a protected class and harm to the community generally 
by the perpetuation of patterns of segregation.341 Perpetuation of segregation claims are
typically filed against municipal defendants alleged to have used their zoning or other 
land-use powers, either through individual decisions or broad policy, to prevent 
construction of integrated housing developments in predominantly white areas.342
                                                          
334 United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181, 1184 (2d Cir. 1987); MHANY Mgmt. 
v. Cty. of Nassau, No. 05-cv-2301, 2017 WL 4174787, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153214, at *4 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2017).
335 Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mount Holly, 658 F.3d 375, 377 
(3d Cir. 2011).
336 Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 747 F.3d at 275.
337 Mayor of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. JFM-08-62, 2011 WL 1557759, 
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44013, at *3–4 (D. Md. Apr. 22, 2011) (finding the city had standing to 
challenge predatory lending claims against the lender offering onerous and risky terms that 
resulted in high numbers of defaults and foreclosures in African-American neighborhoods); see 
also Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017), discussed infra at notes 415–
19 and accompanying text.
338 H.R. Res. 1095, 110th Cong. (2008) (enacted).
339 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977).
340 Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731, 740 (7th Cir. 1971).
341 Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 934, 937–38 (2d Cir. 1988).
342 But see, e.g., Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1293 
(7th Cir. 1977) (observing that perpetuation of segregation claims against private defendants 
have also been recognized).
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A plaintiff may establish a violation of the FHA in one of two ways: showing 
discriminatory intent or disparate impact.343 Proving the first theory is a difficult task 
because those determined to violate the law with impunity rarely announce their 
intentions or reveal their animus.344 Consequently, the disparate impact theory has 
been the most successful way to challenge ostensibly harmless practices that operate 
to exclude or affect certain groups disproportionately.345 Thus, disparate impact theory 
is implicated in cases where facially neutral policies and laws do not evince 
discriminatory import upon passage, but develop into powerful discriminatory 
mechanisms when applied.346 Every circuit court that has considered the question 
upheld this theory as viable.347
2. The Recent Disparate Impact Trilogy
Only recently, in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. The 
Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.,348 did the Supreme Court validate a cause of 
action under the FHA for discrimination by disparate impact.349 This was the third case 
on the same issue that the Court was poised to consider.350 A Supreme Court ruling on 
the cognizability of disparate impact theory was nixed in two prior cases when the 
parties settled at the last minute.351 The Eighth and Third Circuit Courts of Appeal 
upheld the disparate impact theory in Gallagher v. Magner352 and Mt. Holly Gardens 
Citizens in Action v. Township of Mount Holly.353
                                                          
343 Huntington Branch, NAACP, 844 F.2d at 933.
344 There are, to be sure, a number of cases where the bias is more than evident. See City of 
Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188, 195–96 (2003) (upholding a 
referendum to block an ordinance providing for affordable housing despite evidence that 
referendum was motivated by racial animus).
345 Robert G. Schwemm & Calvin Bradford, Proving Disparate Impact in Fair Housing 
After Inclusive Communities, 19 LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 685, 685 (2016).
346 Id. at 693.
347 McCulloch v. Town of Milan, 559 F. App’x 96, 99 (2d Cir. 2014); City of Fort 
Lauderdale v. Scott, 551 F. App’x 972, 978 (11th Cir. 2014); Pac. Shores Props., LLC v. City 
of Newport Beach, 730 F.3d 1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 2013); L & F Homes & Dev., LLC v. City of 
Gulfport, 538 F. App’x 395, 398 (5th Cir. 2013); Sheptock v. Fenty, 707 F.3d 326 (D.C. Cir. 
2013); Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mount Holly, 658 F.3d 375, 377 
(3d Cir. 2011); Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 565 U.S. 1013 
(2011), reh’g denied, 636 F.3d 380 (8th Cir. 2013); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of 
Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1293 (7th Cir. 1977).
348 Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 
2510 (2015).
349 Id.
350 Id.
351 Allegedly, the Obama Administration orchestrated the settlements to avert a ruling 
against the disparate impact theory.
352 Gallagher, 619 F.3d at 845.
353 Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mount Holly, 658 F.3d 375, 377 
(3d Cir. 2011).
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In Gallagher, the owners of substandard housing challenged the aggressive 
enforcement of the housing code.354 The owners argued that the enforcement caused a 
discriminatory impact because it raised their costs, which in turn reduced the number 
of affordable housing units available to protected classes.355 The court found that the 
evidence reasonably demonstrated that the city’s aggressive enforcement of the 
housing code resulted in a disproportionate impact on racial minorities, particularly 
African-Americans.356 Additionally, the evidence showed that the city’s housing code 
enforcement temporarily, if not permanently, burdened landlords.357 This burden on 
landlords indirectly burdened their tenants.358 The court also found that, given the 
existing shortage of affordable housing in the city, it was reasonable to infer that the 
overall amount of affordable housing decreased as a result.359 They concluded that 
after “taking into account the demographic evidence in the record, it [was] reasonable 
to infer racial minorities, particularly African-Americans, were disproportionately 
affected by these events.”360
In Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, the city embarked on an urban renewal 
program that called for the condemnation of many homes, most of which were owned 
by African-Americans and Latinos.361 The homes to be constructed in the revitalized 
area were unaffordable to a disproportionate number of the minority residents 
displaced by the program.362 The court ruled:
[A] disparate impact inquiry requires us to ask whether minorities are 
disproportionately affected by the redevelopment plan. . . . [A] prima facie
case of disparate impact [can be established] by showing that minorities are 
disproportionately burdened by the redevelopment plan or that the 
redevelopment plan ‘[falls] more harshly’ on minorities.363
In Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs,364 the Court ruled that a 
disparate impact theory was cognizable under the FHA.365 The Texas Department of 
Housing and Community Affairs (the “Department”) was the state agency in charge 
                                                          
354 Gallagher, 619 F.3d at 835.
355 Id. at 831.
356 Id. at 835.
357 Id. at 838.
358 Id. at 835.
359 Id.
360 Id.
361 Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mount Holly, 658 F.3d 375, 378 
(3d Cir. 2011).
362 Id. at 384.
363 Id. at 383 (quoting Doe v. City of Butler, 892 F.2d 315, 323 (3d Cir. 1989)).
364 Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 
2507 (2015).
365 Id. at 2512.
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of administering the federal Low Income Housing Tax Credit Program.366 The 
program required states to allocate tax credits according to a “‘qualified allocation 
plan . . . which set[] forth selection criteria to be used to determine housing priorities 
of the housing credit agency which [were] appropriate to local conditions . . . .”367 The 
federal law required states’ qualified allocation plan to give preference to projects in 
low-income areas.368 State law required the Department to “score and rank the 
applications using a point system,” which in turn required the Department to prioritize 
the criteria “in descending order.”369 The Department retained some discretion to 
develop “below-the-line” criteria to supplement those statutorily mandated factors, but 
these could not outweigh any “above-the-line” factors.370 The trial court found that the 
Department “approved tax credits for 49.7% of proposed non-elderly units in 0% to 
9.9% Caucasian areas, but only approved 37.4% of proposed non-elderly units in 90% 
to 100% Caucasian areas.”371
The Court’s ruling rested on a comparison to other antidiscrimination laws. The 
Court first traced the history of segregated housing patterns in the country.372
Notwithstanding the striking down of de jure residential segregation by race, the 
vestiges of racial segregation remained.373 The social unrest during the 1960s and the 
conclusions of the Koerner Commission set up by President Johnson led to the passage 
of the FHA.374
Next, the Court looked to the language of two analogous antidiscrimination 
statutes: Title VII, which governs employment discrimination, and the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act.375 The Court concluded that Congress proscribed 
not only overt discrimination, but also practices that are fair in form but discriminatory 
in operation.376 “‘Congress directed the thrust of [operative provisions of § 703(a)(2)] 
to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation.’”377 Thus, 
“[i]n light of the statute’s goal of achieving ‘equality of employment opportunities and 
remov[ing] barriers that have operated in the past’ to favor some races over others, the 
                                                          
366 Id. at 2513–14.
367 26 U.S.C. § 42(m)(1)(B)(i) (2018).
368 Id.
369 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2606.6710(b)–(b)(1) (West 2018); Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & 
Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2513–14.
370 Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 747 F.3d 275, 
277–78 (5th Cir. 2014).
371 Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2514 (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 749 
F. Supp. 2d 486, 499 (N.D. Tex. 2010)).
372 Id. at 2515.
373 Id.
374 Id. at 2516.
375 Id.
376 Id. at 2517.
377 Id. (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)).
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Court held that § 703(a)(2) of Title VII must be interpreted to allow disparate-impact 
claims.”378
Similarly, the language of the ADEA prohibited such “actions that ‘deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an 
employee, because of such individual’s[] race or age.”379 The Court also noted that 
“the text of these provisions ‘focuses on the effects of the action . . . rather than the 
motivation . . . .’”380 The Court concluded that, together, the rulings under Title VII 
and the ADEA instruct “that antidiscrimination laws must be construed to encompass 
disparate-impact claims when their text refers to the consequences of actions and not 
just to the mindset of actors, and where that interpretation is consistent with statutory 
purpose.”381 The same language appears in the FHA, which makes it unlawful “[t]o 
refuse to sell or rent . . . or refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise 
make unavailable or deny . . . ” fair housing.382 The use of the words “‘otherwise make 
unavailable’ refers to the consequences of an action rather than the actor’s intent”;383
thus, “the operative text looks to results” rather than intent.384
Allowing disparate impact claims is consistent with FHA’s purpose to eradicate
discriminatory practices within a sector of the nation’s economy.385 As such, the theory 
has been applied to strike down zoning laws and other housing restrictions that 
function to unfairly exclude minorities from certain neighborhoods without any 
sufficient justification.386 Disparate impact plays a role in uncovering discriminatory 
intent, permitting plaintiffs to counteract unconscious prejudices and disguising 
animus that escape easy classification as disparate treatment. Yet, liability based solely 
on “statistical disparity” is not likely to be ruled a violation.387 Instead, a causal 
connection between the policy and the impact is required as part of the prima facie 
case.388 The disparate impact theory only mandates “‘removal of artificial, arbitrary, 
and unnecessary barriers,’ not the displacement of valid governmental policies.”389
The best application is one that gives housing authorities and private developers the 
leeway to state and explain the valid interest served by their policies. This application 
is analogous to the business necessity exception under Title VII and is a defense 
                                                          
378 Id. (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429–30).
379 Id. at 2518 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 235 
(2005)).
380 Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Smith, 544 U.S. at 236).
381 Id.
382 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2018).
383 Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2518.
384 Id. at 2519.
385 Id. at 2521.
386 See supra text accompanying note 266.
387 Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2523.
388 Id. at 2523–24.
389 Id. at 2522 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
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against disparate impact liability.390 Further, disparate impact liability does not 
mandate any particular set of priorities or their ordering.391
3. Permutations of Disparate Impact Theory
The federal circuit courts have held that “[t]o establish a prima facie case under 
[the disparate impact] theory, the plaintiff must show: ‘(1) the occurrence of certain
outwardly neutral practices, and (2) a significantly adverse or disproportionate impact
on persons of a particular type produced by the defendant’s facially neutral acts or
practices.’”392 Merely showing impact is not enough; a plaintiff must demonstrate a 
“‘causal connection between [a] facially neutral policy . . . and the resultant [impacts on a] 
proportion of minority’ group members in the population at issue.”393
The circuit courts have developed a number of permutations of this theory.394 In most 
circuits, a plaintiff generally must present statistical evidence showing a 
disproportionate or segregative effect.395 Once the plaintiff makes a prima facie 
showing, the court performs a burden-shifting analysis,396 meaning the plaintiff could 
shift the burden to the defendant to show that the challenged practice is justified by a 
“substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory objective.”397 If that showing is made, most 
burden-shifting circuits assign a further burden to the defendant to show that no less 
discriminatory alternatives could achieve the objective.398 The Sixth and Eighth 
                                                          
390 See, e.g., Mountain Side Mobile Estates P’ship v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 56 F.3d 
1243, 1254 (10th Cir. 1995).
391 Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Dev., 135 S. Ct. at 2523.
392 Tsombanidis v. W. Haven Fire Dep’t, 352 F.3d 565, 574–75 (2d Cir. 2003) (emphasis 
omitted) (quoting Reg’l Econ. Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v. City of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 52–
53 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 306 (9th Cir. 1997))).
Although a claimant does not need to provide proof of discriminatory intent, he must demonstrate 
“the challenged practice of the defendant ‘actually or predictably results in racial discrimination; in 
other words[,] that it has a discriminatory effect.’” Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Huntington, 844 
F.2d 926, 934 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184–85
(8th Cir. 1974)); id. at 935 (noting further that sometimes “[facially neutral] rules bear no relation to 
discrimination upon passage, but develop into powerful discriminatory mechanisms when applied.”). 
“The discriminatory effect of a rule arises in two contexts: adverse impact on a particular minority 
group and harm to the community generally by the perpetuation of segregation.” Id. at 937 (citing 
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977)).
393 Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale Coll., 237 F.3d 81, 90–91 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Brown 
v. Coach Stores, Inc., 163 F.3d 706, 712 (2d Cir. 1998)).
394 See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(a) (2013); Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. 
of Mount Holly, 658 F.3d 375, 382 (3d Cir. 2011).
395 Mount Holly, 658 F.3d at 385; Huntington Branch, NAACP, 844 F.2d at 936; Thompson 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 348 F. Supp. 2d 398, 417 (D. Md. 2005).
396 Michael G. Allen et al., Assessing HUD’s Disparate Impact Rule: A Practitioner’s 
Perspective, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 155, 161 n.36 (2014) [hereinafter Allen et al., 
Assessing HUD’s Disparate Impact Rule]. 
397 Id. at 161; see, e.g., Mount Holly, 658 F.3d at 385–86; Huntington Branch, NAACP, 844 
F.2d at 936.
398 Graoch Assocs. No. 33 Ltd. P’ship v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro Human Relations 
Comm’n, 508 F.3d 366, 374 (6th Cir. 2007).
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Circuits, however, place the ultimate burden on the plaintiff to show that less 
discriminatory alternatives existed.399 Several circuits have gone on to impose a final 
analysis that weighs the defendant’s justifications against the plaintiff’s showing of a 
discriminatory effect.400
In place of the burden shifting approach, a minority of circuits utilize a
multifactor balancing test that considers: 
(1) the magnitude of discriminatory effect, (2) whether there is any
evidence of discriminatory intent, (3) the defendant’s interest in taking the
complained-of action, and (4) whether the plaintiffs sought to compel
the defendant affirmatively to provide housing for members of a
protected class or merely restrain the defendant from interfering with
individual property owners who wish to provide such housing.401
Attorneys at the Equal Justice Society synthesized these approaches, stating:
Courts must conduct a “searching inquiry” of whether unlawful 
discrimination has influenced the decisions that lead to disparate treatment. 
By focusing a legal inquiry on a municipality’s intent at the moment a 
redevelopment decision is made, “the law fails to recognize that 
discrimination ‘can intrude much earlier, as cognitive process-based errors 
in perception and judgment subtly distort the ostensibly objective data set 
upon which a decision is ultimately based.’”402
In fact, “measuring disproportionate impact . . . attributable—at least in part—to 
implicit bias is [even] more valuable than measuring explicit bias.”403 This is where 
disparate impact has its most value because it checks harmful government and private 
conduct where illicit motivations are subliminal.404 As the Court explained, the point 
of disparate impact theory is not to assign liability just because a state of affairs seems 
                                                          
399 Allen et al., Assessing HUD’s Disparate Impact Rule, supra note 396, at 161.
400 Id.
401 Cent. Ala. Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Magee, 835 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1195 (M.D. Ala. 2011), 
vacated on other grounds by No. 11-16114-CC, 2013 WL 2372302, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 
11316 (11th Cir. May 17, 2013). “This is the approach used in the Seventh Circuit and, for 
claims against governmental defendants, the Fourth Circuit.” Allen et al., Assessing HUD’s 
Disparate Impact Rule, supra note 396, at 162 n.41 (first citing Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 
F.2d 565, 575 (6th Cir. 1986); then citing Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th 
Cir. 1982); then citing Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 
(7th Cir. 1977)).
402 Wilson Sonsini Goodrich et al., Lessons from Mt. Holly: Leading Scholars Demonstrate
Need for Disparate Impact Standard to Combat Implicit Bias, 11 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY 
L.J. 241, 261–62 (2014) (quoting Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious 
Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741, 746 (2005) (quoting Linda H. Krieger, The Content of 
Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment 
Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1211 (1995))).
403 Id. at 262.
404 See id.
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unfair or there is different treatment.405 Instead, disparate impact portends liability 
because that unfairness or different treatment is the result of volitional acts by a 
defendant, regardless of whether he intended to do harm when there were other, non-
harmful choices available. This theory puts the onus on the putative defendant to be 
cognizant of the consequences of his act, but it does not punish absent culpability.406
The culpability resides in the elevation of all other interests, particularly the proverbial 
“property values,” and in the case of FHFA, conserving assets, thereby denying those 
on the outside of this paradigm the ability to fulfill one of society’s most basic needs.407
4. Disparate Impacts from the Crisis
Although we cannot charge the GSEs for causing the housing crisis, we can 
attribute to them some responsibility for its intensity, the irresponsible practices, and, 
to some extent, the cupidity that animated non-government actors. Heedless lending on 
subprime terms by loan originators and securitizing those loans for resale on the secondary 
markets by the GSEs set the industry up for collapse.408 At the time of the collapse, the 
GSEs held millions of mortgages and over $5.14 trillion in outstanding mortgage-backed 
securities.409 However, the effects from the industry collapse were not spread evenly 
among the population. Subprime lending was more prevalent in the fast-growing areas 
of the country, such as the desert west and Florida, which were experiencing rapid 
new construction.410 Also, African-American and Latino borrowers had a much higher 
likelihood than white borrowers with the same risk profile (e.g., credit score, income 
level) to be approved for and steered toward a subprime mortgage rather than a more 
affordable and predictable fixed rate mortgage.411 Further, when the borrowers 
defaulted, these same minority borrowers faced foreclosure at nearly twice the rate 
than for white borrowers at the same income level.412 The high levels of foreclosures 
                                                          
405 Id. at 263.
406 Id.
407 Id. at 249.
408 See discussion supra Section II.B.1.
409 Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 81, at 488.
410 Matthew J. Rossman, Counting Causalities in Communities Hit Hardest by the 
Foreclosure Crisis, 2 UTAH L. REV. 245, 257 (2016) (citing Chris Mayer & Karen Pence, 
Subprime Mortgages: What, Where, and to Whom? 11 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Working Paper No. 
2008-29, 2008), http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2008/200829/200829pap.pdf).
411 Id. at 258 (citing DEBBIE GRUENSTEIN BOCIAN ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING,
FORECLOSURES BY RACE AND ETHNICITY: THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF A CRISIS 6 (2010), 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/foreclosures-by-race-
and-ethnicity.pdf); id. at 258 n.87 (first citing MONIQUE W. MORRIS, NAACP, DISCRIMINATION 
AND MORTGAGE LENDING IN AMERICA (2009), http://action.naacp.org/page/-
/resources/Lending_Discrimination.pdf; then citing Paul S. Calem et al., The Neighborhood 
Distribution of Subprime Mortgage Lending, 29 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 393, 407 (2004), 
Rossman, supra note 410, at 258 n.90; and Mayer & Pence, supra note 410, at 12–14).
412 Green, Disquiet on the Home Front, supra note 13, at 13 n.25; Rossman, supra note 410, 
at 258 (citing BOCIAN ET AL., supra note 411, at 2).
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in minority communities forced reductions in home prices by a much larger percent 
than in white communities.413
C. GSEs’ Policies and Practices on the Handling and Disposition of REO Properties 
Violate the FHA
Although the disparate impacts on minorities from the housing crisis is well-
established, holding the GSEs accountable absent a sufficiently close nexus between 
their imprudent conduct and the eventual fall of the market is another hurdle that must 
be overcome. In Bank of America Corporation. v. City of Miami,414 the Supreme Court 
concluded, “foreseeability alone is not sufficient to establish proximate cause under 
the FHA . . . .”415 In that case, the city had standing to assert a FHA violation against 
lenders as to minority borrowers.416 However, the city had to allege more than simply 
the foreseeability that predatory loan terms would result in disproportionate 
defaults.417 Instead, the city had to show that disproportionate defaults caused 
foreclosures and vacancies, which lowered property values and harmed the city by 
reducing property tax revenues.418
With respect to the GSEs’ policies on the disposition of REO properties, there is 
more than the mere foreseeability of harm, but harm in fact. The FHA makes it 
unlawful to “otherwise make unavailable or deny” housing to a protected class “by, 
among other things, action that limits the availability of affordable housing.”419 As the 
Supreme Court explained in Texas Department of Housing and Community 
Development, making housing unavailable can occur by intentional, conscious acts as 
well as by subliminal, unthinking acts, such as by official acts in the form of granting 
permissions and doling out public benefits.420 Such official acts rarely evince the kind 
                                                          
413 Rossman, supra note 410, at 259 n.92 (citing JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD 
UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 31–32 (2014) (“asserting that price drops as a 
result of the Foreclosure Crisis were three times greater in minority neighborhoods than in white 
neighborhoods”); id. (citing Michael Fletcher, A Shattered Foundation: African Americans Who 
Bought Homes in Prince George’s Have Watched Their Wealth Vanish, WASH. POST (Jan. 24, 
2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/01/24/the-american-dream-
shatters-in-prince-georges-county/ (“comparing ‘housing values in two suburban Washington 
Zip codes’ and finding that in the predominantly black community housing prices have not 
recovered any of the nearly 50% in lost value, while in the predominantly white community 
housing prices have recouped two-thirds of lost value”)).
414 Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1300–01 (2017). The city alleged 
predatory lending practices on minority borrowers set high rates of foreclosures causing 
declines in property values that impacted racial composition of the city and reduced tax revenues 
to the city. Id.
415 Id. at 1305.
416 Id. at 1301.
417 Id. at 1306.
418 Id. at 1305.
419 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2018); Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mount 
Holly, 658 F.3d 375, 381 (3d Cir. 2011).
420 Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 
2533 (2015); S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel Twp., 336 A.2d 713, 729 
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of overt racial animus that would support a discriminatory treatment claim.421 Yet, the 
performance of these acts may make housing unavailable.422 For example, no 
apartment buildings can be constructed, but expensive, unaffordable detached homes 
can; homes belonging to African-American and Latino families are demolished, and 
the new homes built in their places are unaffordable. On the surface, each of these acts 
all move housing toward the asserted lofty and uncontroversial end of encouraging 
neighborhoods conducive to families or eradicating demoralizing blighted conditions, 
but the impacts are disparate and harmful. For GSEs, their policies on the handling 
and disposition of its REO properties—which include lower maintenance standards, 
sales of nonperforming loans to investors, and the Arm’s Length and Make-Whole 
policies—reveal impacts that are disparate, but largely avoidable.423
1. Disparate Maintenance Standards
A City of Chicago ordinance that imposed maintenance responsibility upon 
mortgagees as to mortgages in default was rejected, but that ruling rested on the 
Supremacy Clause.424 A new challenge based on either disparate treatment or disparate 
impact under the FHA may have a stronger chance of success. In December 2016, the 
National Fair Housing Alliance filed a housing discrimination suit against Fannie Mae 
and alleged that it purposefully failed to maintain its REO properties in middle- and 
working-class African-American and Latino neighborhoods to the same level of 
quality it did for foreclosured properties it owned in white middle- and working-class 
neighborhoods.425 The complaint offered substantial photographic evidence of the 
unmowed lawns and invasive weeds, unrepaired doors and windows, and litter and 
trash that characterized the properties in the minority neighborhoods in contrast to the 
neatly maintained properties in the white neighborhoods.426 The lawsuit maintained 
that these maintenance lapses invite vandalism, create (or at least perpetuate) blight, 
reduce home values in the community, and cause physical (because of the presence of 
mold) and emotional health problems for residents.427 The lapses also lower the 
                                                          
(N.J. 1975); Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 341 N.E.2d 236, 239 (N.Y. 1975); Goodrich et 
al., supra note 402, at 261.
421 Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2512.
422 Id. at 2510.
423 FANNIE MAE, SELLING GUIDE: FANNIE MAE SINGLE FAMILY 46 (2014).
424 Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. City of Chicago, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1061–63 (N.D. Ill. 
2013).
425 Nat’l Fair Hous. All. Inc. v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, No. 3:2016cv06969 (N.D. Cal. filed 
Dec. 5, 2016); see Press Release, Nat’l Fair Hous. All., National Fair Housing Alliance Accuses 
Mortgage Giant Fannie Mae of Racial Discrimination in 38 U.S. Metro Areas (Dec. 5, 2016), 
http://nationalfairhousing.org/2016/12/05/national-fair-housing-alliance-accuses-mortgage-
giant-fannie-mae-of-racial-discrimination-in-38-u-s-metro-areas/.
426 Nat’l Fair Hous. All. Inc., No. 3:2016cv06969.
427 Id.
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likelihood that the foreclosed homeowner will be able to recover the property because 
few lenders are willing to lend on a dilapidated property.428
A party could make a disparate impact claim by offering evidence that the 
properties were comparable (in terms of their pre-foreclosure values and levels of 
outstanding debt) and the care and maintenance of homes situated in minority 
neighborhoods were remarkably different from that in white neighborhoods.
2. Disparate Impact Under NPL Bulk Sale Policy
As suggested earlier, the NPL sale policy was implemented to conserve the GSEs’
assets.429 While this aim cannot be faulted out of hand, we can criticize and challenge 
the implementation of the sale policy. The first iteration of the NPL program did not 
contain minimum good faith and fairness requirements for the investors in their 
dealings with occupiers (renters or buyers) of the homes.430 In fact, the sale of NPLs 
created what can be described as a cottage industry in a contract for deed, also called 
an installment land contract.431 Nationwide, more than three million people are 
estimated to have bought a foreclosed GSE home through a contract for deed, a device 
attractive to those with poor credit.432 Investors sometimes sell these homes through 
this device for four times their purchase price.433 Some scholars claim that the 
investors are targeting African-American and Latino homebuyers434 because they 
stereotypically are thought to be unsophisticated and inexperienced.435 Several 
                                                          
428 Claudia Coulton et al., REO and Beyond: The Aftermath of the Foreclosure Crisis in 
Cuyahoga County, Ohio, in REO & VACANT PROPERTIES 47, 49 (2010).
429 Amanda Maher, Speed of Sales and Buyers Create Questions About Purpose of Fannie 
Mae’s NPL Bulk-Sales, VALUEWALK (Nov. 12, 2015),
http://www.valuewalk.com/2015/11/fannie-mae-npl-bulk-sales/.
430 FANNIE MAE, FANNIE MAE NPL SALES 6 (2015).
431 Ken Xuhao Zhang, GSE NPL Sales Programs: Five Questions to Ask Before Investing 
in Non-Performing Loans, RISKSPAN (June 13, 2017), https://www.riskspan.com/news-insight-
blog/gse-npl-sales-programs-investing-in-non-performing-loans.
432 Matthew Goldstein & Alexandra Stevenson, Market for Fixer-Uppers Traps Low-
Income Buyers, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2016) [hereinafter Goldstein & Stevenson, Market for 
Fixer-Uppers], https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/21/business/dealbook/market-for-fixer-
uppers-traps-low-income-buyers.html.
433 “Fannie Mae notes the bulk sale program for hard-to-sell homes accounted for a small 
fraction of the 900,000 homes it has sold since the financial crisis[,]” many of them run-down 
and sold at bargain prices. Id.
434 “The [National Consumer Law] [C]enter has begun to survey housing lawyers in states 
where these contracts are most commonly used, in part to help determine the effect of new 
institutional players in the market.” Matthew Goldstein & Alexandra Stevenson, ‘Contract for 
Deed’ Lending Gets Federal Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2016) [hereinafter Goldstein & 
Stevenson, Contract for Deed], 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/11/business/dealbook/contract-for-deed-lending-gets-
federal-scrutiny.html. “Harbour Portfolio bought more than 6,700 single-family homes 
following the financial crisis of 2008, most of them from Fannie Mae through bulk sales. In 
recent months, Harbour has sold more than 600 homes with existing contracts for deeds in place 
to other investment firms and individual investors.” Id.
435 Goldstein & Stevenson, Market for Fixer-Uppers, supra note 432. The authors state:
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lawsuits have been lodged challenging such practices on various grounds.436 These 
seller-financed deals, which include contracts for deed and rent-to-own leases, come 
with great risk. The usual consumer protections applicable to mortgage financing and 
lead paint disclosures,437 among other things, are absent, and landlords can easily evict 
residents after failure to make payments because the seller retains legal title to the 
home until final payment is made.438 Only in the last year or so has the FHFA begun 
to scrutinize the nature of the post-sale relationship between investors and occupants 
of formerly REO properties.439 The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau reportedly 
                                                          
One of several firms Mr. Groeger’s office has fielded complaints about is Harbour 
Portfolio Advisors of Dallas. 
One of the larger firms in this market, Harbour has bought more than 6,700 
single-family homes in Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, Florida, Georgia, Pennsylvania and a 
handful of other states since 2010—most of them from Fannie Mae, according to the 
mortgage finance firm and the foreclosure research firm RealtyTrac. 
Ten of the more than [fifty] homes Harbour bought in Akron have been torn down after 
being condemned and two others are slated for demolition, Mr. Groeger said. 
In Detroit, 300 homes bought by Harbour have received notices for prolonged failure 
to pay property taxes, according to a Wayne County website. Harbour disputes the 
accuracy of the county’s figures and says the number of homes it owns in Detroit is 
much lower. 
. . . . 
In November, they were some of the hosts of a fund-raiser for the Perot Museum of 
Nature and Science. 
Harbour, which raised more than $60 million from wealthy investors, was the single 
largest buyer of foreclosed homes from Fannie Mae’s bulk sale program from 2010 to 
2014, which the mortgage giant used to unload more than 20,000 homes that were hard 
to sell. The homes were bought by Harbour for an average of $8,000 each in cities like 
Akron, Detroit and Flint, Mich.
Id.; see JEREMIAH BATTLE, JR. ET AL., NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., TOXIC TRANSACTIONS 3–4
(2016); see also JAMES H. CARR ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N REAL ESTATE BROKERS, STATE OF 
HOUSING IN BLACK AMERICA (2016).
436 “[A] lawsuit filed earlier this year by the Atlanta Legal Aid Society[] contend[ed] that 
Harbour had targeted African-American communities to sell contracts for deeds on homes at 
inflated prices.” Matthew Goldstein & Alexandra Stevenson, How a Home Bargain Became a 
‘Pain in the Butt,’ and Worse, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/07/business/dealbook/how-a-home-bargain-became-a-
pain-in-the-butt-and-worse.html.
437 Alexandra Stevenson & Matthew Goldstein, Seller-Financed Deals Are Putting Poor 
People in Lead-Tainted Homes, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/26/business/dealbook/seller-financed-home-sales-poor-
people-lead-paint.html.
438 Id.
439 Fannie Targets ‘Abusive Seller Financing’ Sales, REALTORMAG (May 25, 2017), 
http://realtormag.realtor.org/daily-news/2017/05/25/fannie-targets-abusive-seller-financing-
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has begun to investigate whether some companies are taking advantage of 
consumers.440 However, belated scrutiny will not obviate what may be a glaring FHA 
violation. Only selling homes to certain populations through the risky contract for deed 
device surely operates to make housing unavailable when default results in immediate 
eviction.
Contracts for deed are not inventions from the housing crisis.441 In this 
arrangement, the contract remains executory for long periods, such as ten or twenty 
years.442 The buyer typically gains immediate possession and incurs all the risks of 
loss from casualties while the seller holds legal title.443 At the same time, the buyer 
has the burden of maintenance and often has to pay property taxes.444 The greatest risk 
to buyers under contracts for deed is forfeiture upon default, which may occur late in 
the contract term.445 A forfeiture upon default causes the buyer to lose not only the 
property, but all the money that had been paid on the contract to date.446 Unaware of 
equitable protections that might exist under the law, many buyers simply walk away 
from contracts without contesting a seller’s decision to invoke a forfeiture clause. 
Often, the contracts contain arbitration clauses to settle disputes between the seller and 
buyer; this precludes the right to litigate onerous clauses in a court.447
Additional risks confront purchasers of foreclosed property through contracts for 
deed. The homes are often put on the market “as is,” meaning buyers incur substantial 
other costs to repair and bring the properties up to code.448 Municipal officials across 
the country have complained that out-of-state investors who sell properties with a 
contract for deed often perform minimal maintenance on properties and fall behind on 
paying property taxes or water bills.449 Because contracts for deed often are not 
                                                          
sales. “Fannie Mae officials also said this week that they will be reviewing how investors who 
purchase more than [twenty-five] foreclosed homes a year are using the properties. They plan 
to ask those investors to provide data about the homes.” Id.
440 Alexandra Stevenson & Matthew Goldstein, Federal Watchdog Agency Steps Up Inquiry 
into Home Contracts, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2016) [hereinafter Stevenson & Goldstein, Federal 
Watchdog], https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/15/business/dealbook/federal-watchdog-
agency-steps-up-inquiry-into-home-contracts.html.
441 See generally Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, The Installment Land Contract—A
National Viewpoint, 1977 BYU L. REV. 541 (1977).
442 Id. at 543.
443 Id. at 541.
444 Id.
445 Id. at 542.
446 Id. at 543.
447 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Dahlberg, 547 N.W.2d 74, 76 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
448 Crystal Myslajek, Risks and Realities of the Contract for Deed, FED. RES. BANK OF 
MINNEAPOLIS (Jan. 1, 2009), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/community-
dividend/risks-and-realities-of-the-contract-for-deed.
449 “The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is trying to determine how many other firms 
are selling homes nationally with a contract for deed already in place or are renting out homes 
with an option to buy . . . .” Goldstein & Stevenson, Contract for Deed, supra note 434; see
Stevenson & Goldstein, Federal Watchdog, supra note 440.
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recorded in the land records,450 complete statistics on their prevalence is difficult to 
obtain. More importantly, the lack of recording places the buyer at risk of losing all of 
her investments through a sale by the seller to a subsequent purchaser without notice 
of the contract.
The counterargument is that contracts for deed enable home ownership for those 
otherwise unable to obtain a bank loan or to come up with a down-payment.451 In 
recent years, courts and legislatures have responded to the apparent unfairness of the 
forfeiture provisions and have offered some relief.452 Some vendees and their 
advocates appealed to courts and legislatures to expose the truth underlying the 
contract for deed and to illuminate how onerous, given all the equities, forfeiture 
was.453 Some courts were receptive of these arguments. In those cases, the courts 
employed a legal fiction that conceived the vendee/vendor relationship like a 
mortgagor/mortgagee relationship: the seller retained the legal title for purposes of 
security, and the vendee was the owner for all intents and purposes.454 Thus 
established, as a mortgagee, the vendor was bound by those rules that bind all 
mortgagees.455 The vendor was required to foreclose vendee’s interest in cases of 
default.456 If the public sale produced a surplus, it belonged to the vendee.457 At the 
same time, other courts used their equitable powers to intervene to relieve a hapless 
vendee from foreclosure and give her restitution of amounts paid exceeding the land 
value.458 Some states allow for reinstatement of defaulting buyers after payment of 
                                                          
450 Myslajek, supra note 448.
451 Id.
452 Id.
453 There are to be sure some successful uses of contracts for deeds. In Minnesota, a 
“nonprofit program called Bridge to Success sells homes using contracts for deeds.” Goldstein 
& Stevenson, Market for Fixer-Uppers, supra note 432. “The initiative, by Dayton’s Bluff 
Neighborhood Housing Services and the Greater Minneapolis Housing Corporation, requires 
financial coaching and one-on-one counseling for buyers.” Id. The program has bought more 
than 400 homes that were in foreclosure. Id. It uses financing from financial institutions and 
wealthy investors. Id. The contours of the program make the homes affordable, with an average 
purchase price of $145,000, requiring a monthly payment of $1,100, including interest at 7.5%. 
Id. Although the typical contract term is ten years, “the expectation is that buyers will . . . either 
[restructure] the deal with a bank mortgage, or . . . [sell] the home.” Id. Another program run 
by Battery Point Financial, largely funded by leading private equity firm Kohlberg Kravis 
Roberts & Company, “rehabilitates all the homes it sells” and offers twenty-year contracts that 
comply with new federal guidelines pertaining to high cost mortgages. Id. “To date, Battery 
Point has bought more than 300 homes in [sixteen] states and intends to resell the properties for 
around $72,000.” Id.
454 See, e.g., Skendzel v. Marshall, 301 N.E.2d 641, 646 (Ind. 1973).
455 Id.
456 See, e.g., id. at 650–51; Bean v. Walker, 464 N.Y.S.2d 895, 898 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983); 
Eric T. Freyfogle, Vagueness and the Rule of Law: Reconsidering Installment Land Contract 
Forfeitures, 1988 DUKE L.J. 609, 656 n.23 (1988).
457 Bean, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 898–99.
458 Peterson v. Hartell, 707 P.2d 232, 234 (Cal. 1985); Rosewood Corp. v. Fisher, 263 
N.E.2d 833, 838–39 (Ill. 1970).
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amounts in default.459 These state law inventions aimed to mitigate the harm from the 
operation of the contract for deed do not erase the GSEs’ culpability when it engages 
in bulk sales of REO properties to investors without constraints on abusive practices.
3. Disparate Impact from Arm’s Length and Make-Whole Policies
As a disproportionate number of foreclosures occur in minority neighborhoods, 
the same statistic emerged in the course of the applications of the Arm’s Length and 
Make-Whole policies.460 Other practices that led to the housing crisis, including 
inflated property appraisals,461 caused homes to become quickly underwater; the fees 
(e.g., discount points, brokerage fees) and high interest rates increased the cost of 
home ownership.462 These practices made refinancing difficult, if not impossible.463
Requiring the payment of the principal balance, as opposed to the foreclosure purchase 
price as many states allowed, made homeowners ready victims of unfair practices for 
a second time and otherwise made housing unavailable.
VI. CONCLUSION
The housing crisis of 2008 was indeed momentous. The event prompted deep thinking 
about why it occurred and forced consideration of what went wrong, lapses in judgment or 
in oversight, and myopia. The GSEs and private sector investors retreated. The government 
intervened to bail them out of their impossible position. Thereafter, the GSEs lost sight of 
their historical mission to further housing and adopted a program toward asset protection. 
To be sure, for them to continue playing a role in housing, they needed to survive. But, the 
measures taken were heavy-handed and exacting for homeowners. During the Great 
Depression, the federal government tried to tame finance’s most dangerous traits 
through heavy regulation aimed at safety.464 Alas, housing market participants did not 
heed lessons learned from that experience. Given the new mantra of self-preservation, 
the only recourse may be action in the legal trenches. A challenge to the GSEs’ self-
preservation policies under the FHA may have long odds, but such a challenge is not 
altogether impossible. In many respects, these policies are similar to HUD’s programs that 
                                                          
459 Peterson, 707 P.2d at 235; Rosewood Corp., 263 N.E.2d at 835, 838–39 (denying 
application of Forcible Entry and Detainer statute to purchasers under land sale contract).
460 “In 2007, almost half of African Americans who moved out of their homes did so through 
foreclosure rather than sale. Between 1998 and 2006, African American borrowers lost an 
estimated $92 billion of wealth and equity from subprime loans, while Latino borrowers lost an 
estimated $98 billion. This amounts to the greatest loss of wealth for people of color in modern 
U.S. history, reversing recent progress in homeownership.” Sarah Treuhaft et al., Reclaiming 
Foreclosed Properties for Community Benefit, KINTERA (July 2009), 
http://www.kintera.org/site/c.lkIXLbMNJrE/b.5521929/k.9A4/Reclaiming_Foreclosed_Proper
ties_for_Community_Benefit/apps/nl/newsletter2.asp.
461 FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 20, at 12; Audrey G. McFarlane, The Properties 
of Instability: Markets, Predation, Racialized Geography, and Property Law, 2011 WIS. L. REV.
855, 857–58 (2011) (discussing the practice of false appraisals and its effects on minority 
homebuyers).
462 Patricia A. McCoy, Barriers to Foreclosure Prevention During the Financial Crisis, 55 
ARIZ. L. REV. 723, 728–29 (2013).
463 JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 413, at 30–32.
464 Lohr, supra note 4, at B1.
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were found to violate equal protection and civil rights in Gautreaux. In some cases, the 
government agency made decisions, even if well-meaning in aim,465 that disastrously 
impacted a protected class of people. In Gautreaux, the impact was relegating certain 
populations based on race to undesirable areas of the city.466 The GSEs’ policies employed 
different maintenance standards on REO properties and housing became unavailable 
because of the hurdles for buying back foreclosed homes.467 In both cases, the government 
agencies had knowledge of the harm, disparate treatment, and impacts on protected 
persons.468 These claims would not be precluded by federal preemption because they 
involve violations of law. Most concerning in all of this is the GSEs’ new stance, which 
is unforgiving, cowering from any risk, and leaves those most in need without support.
                                                          
465 See Tex. Dep’t. of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 
2507, 2514 (2015) (noting that the agency’s purpose to encourage the construction of affordable 
housing in needy areas, though well-meaning, had negative impacts elsewhere, perpetuating 
segregated housing patterns).
466 Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 448 F.2d 731, 732–33 (7th Cir. 1971).
467 See Stephen M. Dane et al., Discriminatory Maintenance of REO Properties as a 
Violation of the Federal Fair Housing Act, 17 CUNY L. REV. 383, 394 (2014).
468 Gautreaux, 448 F.2d at 739–40.
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